Keeping Faith

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he assessed the difference between sovereignty on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai vs. the West Bank and Gaza. He said there was a great difference. There were recognized international boundaries for Sinai, all of which belonged to Egypt, and for the Golan, all of which belonged to Syria. I asked him where he ascribed sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza, and he replied, "Sovereignty rests among the people who live there, not in either Jordan or Israel." He would not yield any of the occupied land to Israel, at least in this early session. All of it should go back to Egypt, Syria or the Palestinians.

Unlike Begin, Sadat wanted a firm framework for a permanent peace and was eager to deal with all the specific issues while we were together. He agreed with my suggestion that, once a "framework for peace" was signed, aides could draft a peace treaty over a period of three months.

After much haggling over just what kind of agreements should even be sought at Camp David, the three principals eventually decided to try to reach accord on two separate documents. One, to be called "The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel," would deal primarily with ending the recurrent wars between the two nations, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from land in the Sinai seized in the 1973 war, recognition by Egypt of Israel's right to exist and the status of Israeli settlements in the desert. The second, "The Framework for Peace in the Middle East," would outline the procedure for reaching a broader agreement on the more difficult questions of the rights of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza and how those disputed territories would be governed.

Sadat next handed me the opening proposal of the Egyptians. As I read it my heart sank; it was extremely harsh and filled with all the unacceptable Arab rhetoric. It blamed Israel for all previous wars and demanded that Israelis offer indemnities for use of the occupied land, pay for all the oil they had pumped out of Egyptian wells, permit refugees free entry to the West Bank, withdraw their forces to the original pre-1967 boundaries, allow the Palestinians to form their own nation and relinquish control over East Jerusalem. When I had finished reading, Sadat said he would like to offer me some modifications which could later be adopted as acceptable to him. He cautioned me not to reveal these to anyone, because it would destroy his negotiating strength if his final positions were to be placed on the table this early.

Sadat had studied the points I had been making the past few months, he said, and found them reasonable. He recalled the first time we had met, and his conviction then that some of my dreams would never be realized in his lifetime. Now he was prepared to make those dreams come true, because the people of the two countries and most of the world wanted peace.

Typically, Sadat drew the conversation to a close with a strategic analysis of the situation in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan and South and North Yemen. He seemed especially worried about the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia, adding that if a real threat ever developed there, he would be willing to help. He had told Crown Prince Fahd, "Your borders are my borders." In spite of the Saudis' public criticism of his peace initiative, he was still