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Begin conceded that Egypt was not claiming sovereignty over Gaza and added that he was not now preparing to pursue his own claims of sovereignty over the occupied land in the West Bank and Gaza. This concession did not satisfy Sadat. He maintained that neither Israel nor Jordan could claim sovereignty over the West Bank; self-determination by its residents was the only measure of sovereignty and would lead ultimately to a Palestinian state. In his opinion, such a state should not be independent or have military forces, but should be linked to Israel or Jordan. His preference was Jordan. He knew King Hussein wanted the West Bank, but he emphasized again that it belonged neither to Israel nor to Jordan.
I acted as a referee and on occasion explained what was meant when there was an obvious misinterpretation. Strangely, every so often laughter broke out. Once, for instance, one of them referred to kissing TV's Barbara Walters and wondered if the cameras were on and what his wife might think. Another outburst of laughter came during an argument about which one of them was responsible for the hashish trade through the Sinai between Israel and Egypt. Still, we adjourned under considerable strain. Begin expressed his complete confidence in Sadat. Conspicuously, Sadat did not make a similar statement.
I did not know where to go from there. We had accomplished little except to name the difficult issues. Almost every discussion of any subject deteriorated into an unproductive argument, reopening old wounds. Under pressure, the Egyptian leader moved away from details and words and into the realm of principles and broad strategic concepts; feeling pressed, the Israeli leader invariably shifted to a discussion of minutiae or semantics, with an inclination to recapitulate ancient history or to resurrect an old argument.
These differences shaped the negotiating technique I developed in the days ahead, and eventually opened up the road to an agreement. I would draft a proposal I considered reasonable, take it to Sadat for quick approval or slight modification, and then spend hours or days working on the same point with the Israeli delegation. Sometimes, in the end, the change of a word or phrase would satisfy Begin.
I was never far from a good dictionary and a good thesaurus, and on occasion the Americans and Israelis would be clustered around one of these books, searching for acceptable synonyms. What was meant by "autonomy," "self-rule," "devolution," "Palestinian people," "authority," "minor modifications," "refugees," "insure, ensure, or guarantee," and so forth? The Egyptians were never involved in these kinds of discussions with me.
On any controversial issue, I never consulted Sadat's aides but always went directly to their leader. It soon became obvious, however, that Dayan, Weizman or Attorney General Aharon Barak could be convinced on an issue more quickly than the Prime Minister, and they were certainly more effective in changing Begin's mind than I ever was. More important was the bottom