Keeping Faith

Memoirs of a President: JIMMY CARTER

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significance of this development—a rupture between Sadat and me, and its consequences for my country and for the Middle East power balance. I envisioned the ultimate alliance of most of the Arab nations to the Soviet Union, perhaps joined by Egypt after a few months. I told Vance that the best thing for us to do now would be to refuse to sign any document, just to terminate the talks and announce that we had all done our best and failed.

I remained alone in the little study where most of the negotiations had taken place. I looked out to the Catoctin Mountains and prayed fervently that somehow we could find peace. Then I changed into more formal clothes before going to see Sadat. He was on his porch with five or six of his ministers. Vance and Defense Secretary Harold Brown were there to tell them goodbye.

I nodded to them and walked into the cabin. Sadat followed. I explained the extremely serious consequences of his unilaterally breaking off the negotiations: that his action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the U.S.; that he would be violating his personal promise to me; that the onus for failure would be on him. He was adamant, but I was dead serious, and he knew it. I had never been more serious in my life. I repeated some of the arguments. He would be publicly repudiating some of his own commitments, damaging his reputation as the world's foremost peacemaker and admitting the fruitlessness of his celebrated visit to Jerusalem. His worst enemies in the Arab world would be proven right in their claims that he had made a foolish mistake. I told Sadat that he simply had to stick with me for another day or two, after which, if circumstances did not improve, all of us simultaneously would take the action he was now planning.

He explained the reason for his decision to leave: Dayan had told him the Israelis would not sign any agreements. This made Sadat furious. He had accused Dayan of wasting our time by coming to Camp David in the first place. His own advisers had pointed out the danger in his signing an agreement with the U.S. alone [on the basic principles on which a Middle East peace should be based]. Later, if direct discussions were ever resumed with the Israelis, they could say, "The Egyptians have already agreed to all these points. Now we will use what they have signed as the original basis for all future negotiations."

It was a telling argument. I told him that we would have a complete understanding that if any nation rejected any part of the agreements, none of the proposals would stay in effect. Sadat stood silently for a long time. Then he looked at me and said, "If you give me this statement, I will stick with you to the end."

Those were sweet words to hear. I went back to Aspen and told Rosalynn, Fritz, Cy, Harold and Zbig that everything was all right. I described my conversation with Sadat, and we went back to work. It had been a bad time.

Day 12: Breakthrough!

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 16. When Sadat and el-Baz came to meet with me and Cy in the afternoon, we reviewed the Sinai proposal and found no significant disagreement except over the Israeli settlements—and no disagreement at all between myself and Sadat.

On the comprehensive framework, we were also very close. In referring to the Palestinians' authority on the West Bank, I agreed to find a

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