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Sadat said that he and his advisers would go over the paper in detail. I was pleased. Except for the very serious question of Arab armed forces in the occupied territories, the changes he had suggested were quite modest. However, we were certain that his advisers would have many technical proposals. Vance told me that they had a reputation of being the most contentious of all Arabs in international negotiations.
Day 8: "I will not sign"
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12. Early that morning, I went for a long bicycle ride, and as I returned to my cottage, I observed a heated discussion between the Egyptian President and his principal advisers on his front porch. This was most unusual, and worried me. Sadat arrived for our visit five minutes late. He seemed very troubled. I made a few innocuous remarks, but he did not appear to be listening. I immediately felt that he had come to tell me the Camp David negotiations were over.
It was apparent, he said, that Israel was not going to negotiate in good faith and had no intention of signing an agreement. As we of the U.S. struggled to deal with Israeli demands in quest of the elusive peace settlement, we were putting forward proposals that would alienate the Arab world. Such an outcome would also drive a wedge between Egypt and the U.S., in spite of his and my best efforts.
He seemed especially worried about the Saudi reaction, and I promised to invite Crown Prince Fahd to Washington to go over our agreement with him. This assurance only partially alleviated his concern. I reminded him that he had already crossed the bridge of Arab condemnation when he had gone to Jerusalem. I said that this had been one of the bravest acts of a political leader in my lifetime. My comments seemed effective, and Sadat soon departed, still very troubled but without having delivered to me the fatal message of failure and departure.
I worked that afternoon on the terms for an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and spread the Sinai maps out on the dining table to begin this task, writing the proposed agreement on a yellow scratch pad. Within three hours I had finished, and walked over to Sadat's cottage to go over the draft with him. I began to read it aloud, but he reached for the pad, read it, made two changes that would make it more pleasing to Israel and handed it back. "It's all right," he said. Our meeting had lasted less than 20 minutes.
I ate with the Israelis in the dining hall, and during the meal Begin said he wanted to see me as soon as possible for the most serious talk we had ever had. He came to my cottage at about 8 p.m. Then he went into an impassioned speech about the use of Resolution 242 language in the text of our Camp David agreement. He said, "Israel cannot agree under any circumstances to a document which includes this phrase ["inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war"], and I will not sign it."
As he spent another hour talking about the settlements in the Sinai, he became very emotional. Once he mentioned Jerusalem, and quoted to me the Bible verse from Psalms, "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." After that he repeatedly said, "Better my