Keeping Faith

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commitment to open borders and full diplomatic recognition. I went to bed late, tired but pleased. Sadat was staying, the Israelis were being more helpful, and we had a good new plan for a Sinai agreement leading to a peace treaty. But I could not sleep. This is a rare problem for me; even during times of deep worry, I have little trouble sleeping well. I was worrying about Sadat and whether he was safe. We were dealing with some extremely emotional subjects for the Arabs, and it was obvious that some of his more militant advisers were deeply committed to the goals of the P.L.O. and other radical groups. Sadat was making decisions with which they strongly disagreed.

I could not forget the heated discussion I had observed on Sadat's porch. I remembered that earlier in the night Sadat's views on whether Israel could make decisions on Palestinian refugees coming into the West Bank had been directly misrepresented by one of his key advisers. The adviser professed to speak for Egypt, but had not even discussed the issue with his President, and I recalled that earlier that evening when I had wanted to see Sadat, his aides told me that he had retired early and could not be disturbed. In the middle of the night, about 4 a.m., I got up, talked to the Secret Service agents and to Brzezinski, and directed that security around Sadat's cottage be strengthened and kept alert. Later, my concerns seemed groundless, but at the same time, I was greatly relieved to see Sadat in good shape the next day!

Day 10: This impasse would be the end

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14. Dayan and Weizman came by, and soon it all boiled down to the settlements. In desperation I promised to draft language allowing this issue to be left open for future resolution, without preconditions, for at least three months. Thus the question might be finessed with Sadat. No luck. When I showed my new draft to Sadat, he stated that there were preconditions, one being the airfields, the other the settlements, and that he would negotiate on when they would be withdrawn, not if.

This impasse would be the end of our effort for peace. I could not think of any way to resolve this fundamental difference. We began to make plans to terminate the negotiations. That evening I began to list the differences between the two nations, and was heartbroken to see how relatively insignificant they really were, compared to the great advantages of peace. I sat on the back terrace late into the night, but could think of no way to make further progress. My only decision was that all of us should work to leave Camp David in as positive a mood as possible, taking credit for what we had done, and I resolved to continue our common search for an elusive accord.

Day 11: "Sadat is leaving"

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15. I called the U.S. delegation to Aspen, and we discussed how to deal with our failure. I would spend the day getting proposals from Sadat and Begin, so that I could summarize the differences and prepare the final document on Saturday. On Sunday we would adjourn and issue a joint communiqué.

Vance burst in. His face was white, and he announced, "Sadat is leaving. He and his aides are already packed. He asked me to order him a helicopter!"

It was a terrible moment. Now, even my hopes for a harmonious departure were gone. I sat quietly and assessed the