Keeping Faith

Memoirs of a President: JIMMY CARTER

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willing to uphold this commitment.

Sadat wanted a strong initial proposal on the record, to appease his fellow Egyptians and the Arab world, but he would be willing to make major concessions (within carefully prescribed limits) so that his final proposal would prove to everyone the reasonableness of his approach.

While at Camp David, Sadat wanted to make Egypt's decisions himself, did not like to have aides present when he was with me and seemed somewhat uncomfortable when they were around. Sadat spent little time with his staff. In contrast, Begin relied very heavily on his aides. I was soon to be thankful that each man had developed his own style, because in Sadat's case the leader was much more forthcoming than his chief advisers, and in Begin's case the advisers were more inclined to work out difficult problems than was their leader.

Begin came first to the afternoon meeting. I told him quickly that Sadat would present a very aggressive proposal and cautioned him not to overreact. Sadat soon arrived. I decided to play a minimal role during these first sessions so that the other two could become better acquainted. I knew what they had to say. I could have recited some of the pertinent passages in my sleep.

Begin said that many differences were not yet resolved, and that the basic disagreements were so broad as to require a few months of negotiation by technicians working full time five days a week. I then asked Sadat to respond. He said there was already a fundamental difference of opinion, even in these preliminary comments, about what we were to accomplish at Camp David. He stated that his peace initiative to Jerusalem had brought forth a new era. The era of war was coming to an end, he said. Sadat reiterated what he and I had agreed, that we must produce a comprehensive framework for peace, not avoiding any of the controversial issues, and then allow three months of drafting time merely to put our agreement into final form. This would comprise the permanent treaty of peace.

Sadat was strangely ill at ease, uncharacteristically fumbling for words and repeating himself several times. Begin waited very patiently until he got through, then said that when the Catholics choose a new Pope, they say, "Habemus Papam " (We have a Pope). He wanted us to be able to announce, "Habemus pacem " (We have peace). This was the last time I remember him waiting patiently for someone else to finish speaking.

Begin wanted to deal with the Sinai, keep the West Bank and avoid the Palestinian issue. Sadat was determined to address all three. I sided with Sadat, of course, and stated that the principals must address all the controversial issues. The U.S. would reserve the right to put forward its own ideas on an equal basis with the other two, because there might be times when either of them might accept, albeit reluctantly, a proposal from me that they would be unwilling to accept from each other. Begin said these concepts were all right with him.

I asked Sadat, "Are you willing to act in the administration of the West Bank and to conclude an Arab-Israeli treaty if Jordan is not willing to participate?" He replied, "Yes, we are." I then asked if he was willing to negotiate a Sinai agreement at the same time that a West Bank-Palestinian treaty was being concluded, and he said yes but added, "I will

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