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I was desperate, and quickly outlined the areas of agreement and the adverse consequences to both men if the peace effort foundered at this point. I emphasized the U.S. role in the Middle East and reminded them that a new war in this troubled region under present conditions could easily escalate into world war. I asked them to give me at least one more day to understand as best I could their positions, to devise my own compromise proposals and to present my views to both of them. I pointed out to Begin that if the only cause for his rejection of the peace effort was the Sinai settlers, I did not believe the people of his nation or the parliament, the Knesset, would agree. It was my belief that if he would get the settlers to leave Egyptian territory, he could sell this action to his people.
He disputed this, saying that there was no way he could sell a dismantling of the settlements. (He always said "dismantling," though we pointed out to him that the buildings need not be destroyed after the Israelis left.) To move the settlers would mean the downfall of his government—an outcome he was willing to accept if he believed in the cause. But he did not believe in it.
They were moving toward the door, but I got in front of them to block the way. I urged them not to break off their talks; to give me another chance to use my influence and analysis; to have confidence in me. Begin agreed readily. I looked straight at Sadat; finally, he nodded. They left without speaking to each other.
I asked Sadat to let me meet that evening with the Egyptian delegation. I opened the discussion. "I know you are all very discouraged right now. The issue we addressed today was the Israeli settlements in the Sinai, which may be the most difficult one of all. Our position is that they are illegal and should be removed. On this, your views and ours are the same."
Sadat replied. "That man Begin is not saying anything today that he might not have said prior to my Jerusalem initiative. I am willing to have open borders, work on other issues and bring in other Arabs. The man is obsessed. Begin haggles over every word, and is making his withdrawal conditional on keeping land. Begin is not ready for peace."
I said, "Mr. President, Begin is a tough and honest man. In the past he has been quite hawkish. He has been quite forthcoming, compared to the leaders of Israel who preceded him. His present control over the Sinai was derived from wars that Israel did not start. That is Begin's perspective. On the settlements, Begin sincerely wants them to continue. One of his goals is to isolate Gaza from the Sinai, with the settlements as a buffer. Since you have now promised not to let major military forces go beyond the Sinai passes to threaten Israel, there is no longer a legitimate reason for him to maintain the settlements. We do not agree with him and he knows it, but so far he persists. It is painful for him to change his position. On the airfields, the Israelis want some arrangement for transitional control, and I believe this should be worked out. I myself will try to devise an acceptable formula for the West Bank."
Sadat said, "I am willing to give them two years to phase out the settlements." I replied, "You must be more flexible on the exact time—two or three