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I asked him bluntly if he objected to our producing a U.S. proposal at all. He answered that he did indeed object, that it was a bad idea. This was a belated admission of an attitude that had become apparent to us all. Begin said that any U.S. plan would become the focal point of dissension and disagreement after we adjourned from Camp David, and that there was no likelihood of its being accepted by either the Israelis or the Arabs. Those who would disagree with individual parts of the proposal would take out their displeasure on the U.S., which might turn the entire Arab world against us.
I told him I was prepared to face this; the alternative was a deterioration that might lead to a war involving the security of my own country. Political considerations—even the loss of some friendships—were not my paramount concern. I reminded him that Sadat had urged me to be a full partner and that I saw no possibility of progress if the U.S. should withdraw and leave the negotiations to the Egyptians and Israelis, who did not trust each other and often admitted an absence of even mutual respect. I noted that when Sadat had arrived at Camp David, the first analysis he had made was that Begin did not want a peace agreement and only wanted land. Begin replied, "Both of those claims are false."
I said, "I realize that, but that is the way the Egyptians feel. This atmosphere between the two of you is not conducive to any agreement. We are going to present a comprehensive proposal for peace. It will not surprise either you or Sadat. When it is finished tomorrow, I will present it to you first, and then to the Egyptians. I can see no other possibility for progress."
Day 5: Fatigue was taking its toll
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9. I spent almost the entire day working on the comprehensive proposal, consulting very closely with other members of the American team. There were more than 50 distinct issues to be resolved. I was not getting much sleep, and fatigue was taking its toll. I knew that Sadat and I could come up with a reasonable agreement that a majority of Israelis would gladly accept. My major task was to convince Begin. In a way, I understood his dilemma. He was the one who was being pressured to change the private and public commitments of a lifetime.
The only thing that would succeed was a proposal that was patently fair, that did not violate Sadat's broad principles and that we could sell to the other Israelis. From daybreak Saturday, the entire American delegation bent to this task, and shortly after midnight the document was ready to be put into final form.
Day 6: Begin was angry, and so was I
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 10. Late in the afternoon, we met with the Israelis. Vice President Walter Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, Dayan, Weizman and Barak joined Begin and me. I knew this would be a crucial session.
I began by trying to assure the Israelis that the document was a balanced one. "Sadat is willing to continue negotiations toward a final peace treaty even if King Hussein is not, but Sadat received a message today from Hussein saying he would be willing to join the agreement if he finds it acceptable. In any case, it is important to remember that an agreement between Israel and Egypt would preclude any successful