Keeping Faith

Memoirs of a President: JIMMY CARTER

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made a mistake resigning when the Iran rescue mission failed. In my judgment, he should have said: "Mr. President, I might want to quit later. But I would like to stay two or three months to show my support for you and help tide you over this disappointment." He did not do that. But this has never driven a wedge between us.

I have had people tell me that Cy had been so affected by his involvement in the Viet Nam War and his aversion to violence that he may have been overly cautious about the hostage rescue mission. Vance was the strongest dove. But the second strongest dove was myself.

I wanted the Secretary of State second only to me to be the spokesman for foreign policy. Vance was quite reluctant to fill that role. Sometimes I would ask Cy specifically to make a public, sometimes controversial statement. Often, I would watch the evening news to see my Secretary of State, and instead I would see his spokesman, Hodding Carter, on the screen. A lot of it was because of his modesty. He wanted to do the hard work. He is one Cabinet member who worked harder than I did.

On dealing with Congress. When I was first elected, many congressional leaders, especially in the Senate, were convinced they should have been President instead. A substantial number of Democrats had never served with a Democratic President. They looked on the incumbent President as an adversary. I had a rough row to hoe from the beginning. I also did not give the Congress any goodies to take home, nothing popular, where a Congressman could go home and say: "You ought to re-elect me because I voted for the Panama Canal Treaty or because I voted to increase oil prices by deregulation."

There is no doubt I gave Congress too heavy an agenda—twelve or 15 important issues the first year I was in. I would have been better off in the public's estimation as well as with Congress if I had narrowed those down to one or two. But it would not have been like me to postpone the other 13 because they were controversial. I was not the warm, backslapping political friend that some members of Congress would have preferred, but I tried to address issues on a professional basis, and they were decided on their merits.

On special-interest groups. There is no way for me to express adequately my concern about the detrimental impact of special interests in Washington. In many cases members of Congress can be induced to vote against the interests of the country—bought legitimately, with political threats on one hand and financial rewards on the other. The situation is getting worse. You have not only the financial payoffs with contributions and honorariums, but a tendency by Congress and the Administration to weaken ethics restraints. There are also those right-wing political-action committees that can spend hundreds of thousands to promote or defeat a candidate. Their scruples are sometimes nonexistent.

On the Moral Majority. I felt more bitter than I indicated in my book. I put them in the same category as Gerald L.K. Smith and others who have thrived on disharmony, divisiveness and a narrow interpretation of what Christianity is. At times, they were vicious, and there is a growing aversion to their philosophy within the Christian community. It is still a major factor. But I had a calm assurance that my relationship with God was not affected adversely by Jerry

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