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At the beginning, that Thursday afternoon meeting reflected the strain of the earlier arguments. Begin immediately went back to his desire to avoid the difficult problems. He said that regarding the Sinai issues, including settlements and airfields, we should turn the problem over to the military leaders, who could resolve the differences and report back to the heads of government for approval. Sadat quickly replied that this would be a complete waste of time. Without specific direction from the top, there would be no way that his Defense Minister could negotiate for Egypt.
Sadat stated that absolutely no military control would be permitted over Egyptian territory by Israel, the U.S. or any other nation, and that Egypt had no use for the airstrips the Israelis had built. He would prefer that they be plowed up when the Israelis withdrew. Begin then asked about whether Sadat would keep his commitment that the Strait of Tiran would be an open international waterway. Sadat replied, "Of course. I said so before, and I will keep my promise."
Sadat launched into a long and eloquent presentation about how well the Egyptian people had responded to his peace initiative and how they were not interested in hard bargaining with Israel. He added, "They will never accept an encroachment on their land or sovereignty. When Premier Begin says he will keep the Israeli settlements in the Sinai and defend them with force, it is an absolute insult to Egypt. I have tried to provide a model of friendship and coexistence for the rest of the Arab world leaders to emulate. Instead, I have become the object of extreme insult from Israel, and scorn and condemnation from the other Arab leaders. The Israeli attitude has worked against other Arabs' being willing to attempt peace with Israel. My initiative has come, not out of weakness, but out of strength and self-confidence. With success at Camp David, I still dream of a meeting on Mount Sinai of us three leaders, representing three nations and three religious beliefs. This is still my prayer to God!" This statement obviously came from Sadat's heart.
Begin responded well, agreeing with the proposal for us to meet on Mount Sinai. He then reminded us that it had also taken courage to invite Sadat to Jerusalem—the commanding officer of the nation that had launched a sneak attack on Israel only five years earlier in the October War of 1973, killing thousands of Israeli troops. The hospitality with which Sadat had been received by the people of Israel showed the depth of their desire for peace, Begin said.
Now, Begin went on, it was important that the few Israeli settlers in the Sinai be accepted by the Egyptian people as no threat to them and as no encroachment on their sovereignty. There were little more than 2,000 Israelis in the 13 Sinai settlements. Removal of these settlements would not be acceptable to Israel. Sadat could, if he wished, convince his people to accept them as permanent residents. Thus, there seemed an absolute deadlock on the Sinai settlements. Sadat announced angrily that a stalemate had been reached. He saw no reason for the discussions to continue. As far as he was concerned, they were over. Sadat then ignored