Keeping Faith

Memoirs of a President: JIMMY CARTER

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this well and said that the principle was good, but he would agree only if the word "belligerent" was inserted before the word "war" [to distinguish between wars of aggression and pre-emptive strikes for defensive purposes]. He said Israel had been attacked by its Arab neighbors and therefore had a right to occupy lands taken in its own defense.

We then discussed the equally serious problem of the Palestinians: how they should govern themselves after the Israeli military government was terminated, how many would be permitted to return to their homeland, and the status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. There were sharp differences on these points, the most important of all for the Arabs. Israeli security and Palestinian rights were the two crucial demands that would be so hard to reconcile.

Begin was not willing to admit that all the provisions of Resolution 242 applied to the West Bank and Gaza, or that the questions of the Sinai settlements and airstrips would have to be resolved before a peace treaty could be signed. I demurred, but did not spend much time arguing this first night.

Begin had repeatedly promised full autonomy for the West Bank Palestinians, and I pushed him on how much freedom they would have. He replied that the only powers they would not be able to exercise would be those relating to immigration of Palestinian refugees and the security of Israel. This sounded good, but later the Israelis would seek a veto over almost anything of substance the Palestinians could decide, even claiming that road construction and water supplies affect the security of Israel.

Day 2: My heart sank

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6.

Sadat preferred not to begin his official day before 10 a.m., after he had completed his exercise. He was always punctual, calm and self-assured; he was brief and to the point in discussions. He tried not to tell others anything he thought they already knew. Rarely dwelling on details or semamtics, he spelled out his positions in broad terms with emphasis on the strategic implications of decisions.

When he arrived at my cottage, I first gave him a brief report of my meeting with Begin. It was very important, we agreed, not to put Begin on the defensive at this early stage but to let him spell out Israel's position for the record.

Sadat responded that the Prime Minister was a very formal man, difficult to approach or to understand. He believed Begin was bitter, inclined to look back into ancient history rather than to deal with the present and the future. He promised to go to extremes in being flexible, in order to uncover the full meaning of Begin's positions, and stated that if our efforts should fail, then when the equitable Egyptian proposals were made known, they would bring the condemnation of the world on the Israeli leader. I pointed out that Begin was a man of integrity and honor, with very deep and long-held opinions. It was difficult for him to change. He had spent a lifetime developing, expounding and defending his ideas, even at great personal danger.

Now it was Sadat's time to spell out Egypt's position. He sat erect and spoke calmly, referring to a few notes. He explained that Egypt must have every inch of her land returned, with unequivocal sovereignty over it, and that other Arab nations must be treated the same. I asked how

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