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Near the end, he pulled from his pocket a brief typed statement and read it to me. It stated that we had met at Camp David and that Israel and Egypt appreciated the invitation they had received from the U.S. As an alternative to this statement, he said, we could list the items on which there was agreement and those on which we could not agree, and issue these lists as proof of the progress we had made. He claimed that he sincerely wished he could sign my proposal, but the will of the Israeli people must be represented by him as their Prime Minister.
I pointed out that I had seen public opinion polls every two or three weeks in which a substantial majority of the Israeli people were willing to accept a peace treaty with an end to the settlements, the removal of Israeli settlers from the Sinai and the yielding of substantial portions of the West Bank. I was distressed by his attitude and, perhaps ill-advisedly, said that my position represented the Israeli people better than his.
It was a heated discussion, unpleasant and repetitive. I stood up for him to leave, and accused him of being willing to give up peace with his only formidable enemy, free trade and diplomatic recognition from Egypt, unimpeded access to international waterways, Arab acceptance of an undivided Jerusalem, permanent security for Israel and the approbation of the world—all just to keep a few illegal settlers on Egyptian land.
Day 9: Never again a divided city
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13. I decided to concentrate on a new framework draft and to work directly with Aharon Barak and Egyptian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Osama elBaz. Barak seemed to have Begin's trust, and elBaz, the most militant of the Egyptians, could speak accurately for the Arab position. If el-Baz agreed to something, the other Egyptian aides would go along, and I could always override him, if necessary, by going directly to Sadat. At the same time, I could depend on Barak to influence Begin. Both Barak and el-Baz were brilliant draftsmen, fluent in English, and they understood the nuances of the difficult phrases with which we had to work. Vance stayed with me during these long sessions, and the four of us made painstaking but steady progress on the main document.
Many of the suggestions Vance and I had expected to be opposed were accepted immediately by Barak and elBaz, and few of these were ever again questioned by their superiors. We did a lot of work on the Jerusalem paragraph. It referred to Jerusalem as the city of peace, holy to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and stated that all persons would have free access to it, free exercise of worship and the right to visit and travel to the holy places without distinction or discrimination. We agreed that Jerusalem would never again be a divided city, that the holy places of each faith should be under the administration and full authority of their representatives, that a municipal council drawn from the inhabitants should supervise essential functions in the city, and so forth. Both Begin and Sadat approved the text [of the paragraph].
Some differences could not be resolved. Barak refused to discuss the Israeli settlements at all, saying that it was a subject only Begin could address. El-Baz, backed by Sadat, refused to include a