(17 of 35)
As we prepared to adjourn, I said, "Stalemate here would just provide an opportunity for the most radical elements to take over in the Middle East. A trial period for the West Bank can work, if we agree on it. If we don't, then Moscow and the radicals will rejoice. You must understand our special commitment to Israel, and the fact that the Israelis do want peace. They have not yet responded adequately to the Sadat peace initiative, but they have offered to leave the Sinai and to give autonomy or self-government to the West Bank Arabs, and our hope is that they will stop building settlements in the West Bank and remove them from the Sinai. We simply must find a formula that both Egypt and Israel can accept. If you give me a chance, I don't intend to fail."
Day 4: Gloom and foreboding
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8.1 was up early again that morning to work on formulations that might break the deadlock, or at least provide enough incentive to keep both teams in the camp. A sense of gloom and foreboding still prevailed. Sadat's aides had told Brzezinski they were seriously considering leaving, convinced that Begin would never yield on the settlements.
When Begin arrived, I outlined again the areas of agreement and requested flexibility on his part. He complained that the U.S. negotiators were all agreeing with the Egyptian demand that the Sinai settlements be removed, and that this was no way for mediators to act. Then he pulled from his pocket the dog-eared copy of Sadat's demands and began once again to delineate its unacceptable portions. I tried to convince him that this was not the final Egyptian position. Begin said he did not see how honorable men could put forward one thing publicly and a different thing privately.
He then gave another half-hour explanation of why it was imperative that the Sinai settlements be retained, pointing out that there were 400,000 people in Gaza who were highly susceptible to subversion and might prove a threat to Israel. He stated emphatically, "I will never personally recommend that the settlements in the Sinai be dismantled!" He added, "Please, Mr. President, do not make this a U.S. demand."
I noted with great interest, but without comment, the change in his words. "Never personally recommend" did not mean that he would never permit the settlements to be removed. The change was subtle but extremely significant. If others in Israel could be made to assume the onus for the decision, then, finally, there was at least a possibility for resolving this issue.
I stated that I absolutely disagreed with him about the settlements, now that Sadat had agreed there would be no attack forces in the Sinai. Instead, there would be 130 km of demilitarized desert between Egypt and Israel. I emphasized that there were no reasons for the settlements to exist after a peace agreement, and that they would be a source of more aggravation and dissension than of peace and security.
Begin implored, "Mr. President, do not put this in a proposal to us." I responded, "Mr. Prime Minister, we cannot avoid addressing the most contentious issues, and this is the one on which the entire Camp David talks have foundered so far. I cannot let Sadat tell me not to discuss Israeli security on the West Bank. I cannot let you