(7 of 35)
Begin interjected that on the security issue, the Egyptians had taken just the opposite view. This was the most crucial point for the Israelis. If they were to withdraw from the West Bank or allow the Arabs there to have enhanced political status, they wanted to be certain that no successful military attack could be launched against them. With total withdrawal from the West Bank, their security problems would be very serious.
Begin then outlined his previous position on the Sinai, emphasizing his most disturbing point, that the Israeli settlements on Egyptian soil were a necessary buffer between Gaza and Egypt. He next addressed the issue of a separate agreement with Egypt, to the exclusion of the Palestinians, Jordanians and Syrians. Begin believed that an agreement on the Sinai might come first, with a later accord on "Judea and Samaria." (Begin always referred to the West Bank by the biblical names, I assume to engender the notion that this was the promised land that God himself had given the Jews.) He was not asking for such a procedure now, he said, because it might embarrass Egypt if its leader did not appear to represent the interests of Arabs who were not present. He realized how strongly Sadat would object to any agreement implying that Egypt had acted only for its own benefit. It was encouraging to me that Begin acknowledged the Egyptian concerns.
The Prime Minister believed the Sinai should be demilitarized but that the three airfields the Israelis had built there should be kept by them for three to five years; afterward, one or perhaps two could be for civilian purposes, with Egypt in control but Israel retaining the right to use them. Turning one airfield into a U.S. airbase would be perfectly all right.
We had anticipated this, and I responded that we did not desire any military bases in the heart of the Middle East but that if it was necessary for peace, we would consider such an idea. Begin proposed that sovereignty over the West Bank-Gaza area be left open, and reiterated that some Israeli military forces would have to be kept there. He was convinced that if Israel pulled out completely, the P.L.O. terrorists would take over within 24 hours. But he stated emphatically that he was willing for the West Bank Palestinians to have autonomy: Begin always said "full autonomy." (We were to spend several hours one evening seeking a common understanding of what "autonomy" meant—unsuccessfully.)
We then addressed the really tough issues. I told Begin that Sadat would never yield on leaving Israeli settlements anywhere in the Sinai. For him, complete sovereignty meant a total absence of Israeli dwellers. Begin did not respond, but it was my impression that he thought I was mistaken about this, that with other Israeli concessions, Sadat might change his mind.
Another serious difference was the phrase from United Nations Resolution 242, "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The Arabs would all insist that Israel acknowledge the applicability of this principle in any treaties signed, because it would recognize that lands occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War had not legally changed hands. Begin understood