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We finally adjourned, and I asked Dayan to walk with me to my cottage. He was competent and levelheaded. I felt that if either he or Weizman were heading the delegation, we would already have reached agreement (although it was Begin's proposal on the Sinai that had helped to bring us to Camp David).
I told Dayan that I considered Begin to be unreasonable and an obstacle to progress, and was beginning to have doubts about his genuine commitment to an agreement and a peace treaty. I outlined the moves Sadat had made to be forthcoming, and his private assurances to me concerning additional flexibility—provided a few crucial points were honored. I asked Dayan to help me within the Israeli delegation on these few issues. Dayan understood my problem but was convinced that Begin did want an agreement. He said that the issue of the settlements was the most difficult for Begin. He asked me to try to induce Sadat to let the title to the Sinai settlements be transferred to Egypt but allow the Israelis to continue to live there for a limited time, just as they would be permitted to live in Cairo or Alexandria. I promised to bring this matter up with Sadat, but did not think there was any chance for success; he would consider it a violation of Egyptian sovereignty.
Daybreak was approaching, but it was still dark as Dayan turned to leave. He had difficulty seeing the trees between him and the path, and when he walked into one of them, I was reminded of how seriously his eyesight was impaired. My heart went out to him.
Day 7: Jerusalem was the no-win issue
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11. Though I got up early to incorporate into our proposal the Israeli changes with which we agreed, a final typed version was not ready when Sadat arrived, alone, at Aspen. We discussed the Sinai negotiations while we waited. Sadat was not willing to let any of the [Israeli] airfields remain on his land, and he immediately rejected the idea of Egyptian title to the Sinai settlements while Israelis continued to live in them.
When I asked him if he would permit Jews from any nation, including Israel, to live in Cairo or in Aswan, he replied, "Of course." I pointed out to him that in that case it was not logical to exclude them from the Sinai settlements. Sadat said, "Some things in the Middle East are not logical or reasonable. For Egypt, this is one of them." He was firm—they would have to leave. He wanted the withdrawal of all Israelis from the Sinai to be completed within two years. I preferred three, to accommodate Israeli needs, and he agreed.
The retyped proposal arrived, and Sadat read it aloud, pausing occasionally to comment or to suggest a change. One came as a surprise; he made a new demand that Egyptian and Jordanian armed forces be allowed in the West Bank and Gaza. I objected strongly. Then we discussed Jerusalem, which everyone at Camp David recognized as the no-win issue. It was charged with emotion. Begin knew he represented Jews all over the world, and Sadat knew that in a way he was speaking for more than 500 million Muslims. I tried to convince Sadat that he would be better off not trying to solve this problem at Camp David. No matter what kind of compromise might emerge, he would be severely criticized by radicals