Keeping Faith

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influence on the West Bank. This was the root of Sadat's distrust of Begin's motives, and I admit that I shared the belief that the Israeli leader would do almost anything concerning the Sinai and other issues to protect Israel's presence in "Judea and Samaria." I expressed this concern as forcefully as possible. Begin was evasive. His proposal was that everyone simply live together, with the question of sovereignty to be decided later.

The arguments became sharper and more heated. I said that an Israeli commitment to withdraw was imperative, but that I was not trying to specify how much. I insisted that the interim proposal to let the Palestinians have full autonomy be as forthcoming as possible, with maximum authority for the people who lived on the West Bank and in Gaza. A continuing military occupation and deprivation of basic citizenship rights among the Arabs was unacceptable to the world and contrary to the principles that had always been such an integral part of Jewish beliefs. Begin shifted back to Sadat's proposal and began to analyze it again in minute detail. We were wasting time.

I became angry, and almost shouted, "What do you actually want for Israel if peace is signed? How many refugees and what kind can come back? I need to know whether you need to monitor the border, what military outposts are necessary to guard your security. What else do you want? If I know the facts, then I can take them to Sadat and try to satisfy both you and him. I believe I can get from Sadat what you really need, but I just do not have your confidence."

Weizman replied, "We wouldn't be here if we didn't have confidence in you."

I repeated my point. "You are as evasive with me as with the Arabs. The time has come to throw away reticence. I believe I can get Sadat to agree to your home-rule proposal if you convince him and me that you are not planning to keep large parts of the West Bank under your permanent control."

I accused Begin of wanting to hold on to the West Bank and said that his autonomy proposal was a subterfuge. He resented this word very much and subsequently brought it up many times. I stressed again Sadat's courage and personal sacrifice in making the peace initiative. A demilitarized Sinai and Egypt's signed agreement with Israel would protect Israel's security in the world community, and even within the Arab world, after we were gone. I emphasized that in Begin the Israelis had a Prime Minister with a demonstrated willingness to give his life for Israel's security. If we wasted this opportunity we would never have it again.

Unmoved, Begin turned again to the Sadat paper, saying that it would force the Jews to become a minority in their own country, that it smacked of the Versailles treaty and that Sadat wanted peace with an Israel that would be not only vulnerable but doomed. He would demand that Sadat withdraw the proposal. I said, "Sadat will never withdraw his proposal. Any of us should have the right to put forward anything we desire. This paper may also represent a Saudi perspective, which Sadat has to accommodate. You can be equally effective in rejecting the paper by saying it is unacceptable."

Then the Israelis conducted a long discussion in Hebrew. This came to be a convenient way for them to speak in confidence without disrupting