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The first week of November 1979 marked the beginning of the most difficult period of my life. The well-being of the American hostages became a constant concern. I would walk in the White House gardens early in the morning and lie awake at night, trying to think of steps I could take to gain their freedom, without sacrificing our honor and security. I listened to every proposal, no matter how preposterous, all the way from delivering the Shah for trial to dropping an atomic bomb on Tehran.
Although Khomeini was acting insanely, we always behaved as if we were dealing with a rational person. I asked Pope John Paul II to contact Khomeini directly, which he agreed to do. (Later, the Ayatullah made an insulting speech about the Pope.) To prepare for possible military action, I had satellite photographs taken to determine where Iran's airplanes and other armed forces were located. I wanted to prevent the spilling of blood on both sides, but it would be inevitable if the hostages were harmed. I was restrained from a pre-emptive military strike by the realization that the Iranian fanatics would almost certainly kill the hostages in response.
On Nov. 6, two days after the embassy was taken, we commenced plans for a rescue operation. Various proposals were discarded as impractical or unlikely to succeed without considerable loss of life on both sides. The greatest problem was the inaccessibility of the embassy compound—more than 600 miles from the nearest operating aircraft carriers and deep within heavily populated Tehran. Although we had regular surveillance of the embassy grounds, there was no way to know precisely where the hostages were being held, and our reports indicated that the guards were determined and quite alert.
We decided that should a public trial of the hostages occur, we would interrupt all commerce with Iran. We studied detailed maps and charts of the coastal waters. My own judgment was that the best and surest way to stop all ship traffic would be to mine the entrances to all Iranian seaports. Effective minesweeping operations by Iran or its potential supporters would be almost impossible. A naval blockade might have been equally effective, but it would have involved repeated confrontations with ships of many other nations, some of which might have been damaged or sunk if they had tried to run the blockade. We also had to meet the possibility of punishment or execution of the hostages. In this case, I was prepared to make a direct military attack on Iran. We pored over aerial photographs of oil refineries and many other strategic targets.
The Iranian militants were now demanding that the Shah be turned over to them for trial, which would almost certainly be followed by execution; that the U.S. apologize for "crimes against the Iranian people"; and that financial damages and the Shah's assets be paid over to Iran. I never gave serious consideration to any of these demands. It would have besmirched our nation's honor to do so.
During this difficult time, we needed all the support at home that we could get. One of my concerns was Kissinger. A