Jimmy Carter: 444 Days Of Agony

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[This was unexpected bad luck. We had observed this site for weeks, and traffic near it was rare. Almost immediately after our landing, though, there was a busload of people, and then a fuel truck, followed closely by a pickup truck. The two latter appeared to be driven by smugglers of gasoline, who took off in the pickup. It was highly unlikely that they would go to the police. In fact, Colonel Beckwith believed they thought our team was Iranian police. But the bus passengers would have to be prevented from sounding an alarm. I approved the removal of all of them to Egypt by C-130 until the rescue itself was concluded, when they would be returned to Iran.]

4:21 p.m. General Jones has heard from General Vaught [who was in Egypt and in overall charge] that everything is under control at Desert One. No one hurt or eliminated. Escaped vehicle proceeded southwest to town 15 miles away, which has gendarmerie post, unmanned at night. Four helicopters refueled at 4 p.m. E.S.T.; two being refueled. [One had been forced down temporarily in the sandstorm, then pressed forward to join the others. This put us somewhat behind schedule, but in itself was no problem.] Vaught expects everything to be over in 40 minutes. Has report that everything "green" at dropoff, and transport is ready.

4:45 p.m. Brown to Brzezinski: "I think we have an abort situation. One helicopter at Desert One has hydraulic problem. We thus have less than the minimum six to go." C-130s to be used to extract. Request decision on mission termination from the President literally within minutes [because of the importance of completing the operation at night].

4:50 p.m. The President, after obtaining a full report from Brzezinski, requests full information from Brown and Jones and specifically the recommendation from the ground commander. [Beckwith and Vaught in Egypt both recommended termination, complying with the plan requiring a minimum of six helicopters.]

4:57 p.m. The President to Brown: "Let's go with this recommendation," and the mission is aborted.

At this point, the Vice President, Christopher, Powell and Jordan joined me and Zbig in my small study, later followed by Vance and then Brown. Although despondent about the failure of the mission, we felt we had the situation under control. I was grievously disappointed, but thanked God that there had been no casualties.

5:18 p.m. Brown informs President that we don't know whereabouts of one helicopter and don't know the crew loss.

5:32 p.m. President calls Jones on secure phone and learns all crews not accounted for. President instructs that needless military action be avoided; air cover if needed for extraction, but an engagement should be avoided. Show of force first before shooting down any Iranian planes. [All of this referred to the helicopter crew we believed to be on the ground in southern Iran. If necessary, I was ready to send in military forces from the aircraft carriers to protect the crew. At one point, intelligence sources reported a beeper signal from the downed helicopter.] Discussion of what commmunication to make to the Iranians and of the needed report to the American people. [After our rescue team departed, I needed to calm the Iranians.]

5:58 p.m. President on secure phone informed by Jones that a