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I told Brzezinski to permit the Shah to go to New York for medical treatment and to inform our embassy in Tehran. I told the State Department to notify Iranian officials—not to seek their permission or approval. Vance reported to me on Oct. 22: "The Iranian government reacted with moderation. We have told them that neither the Shah nor Shahbanou [Empress Farah], who will arrive in New York tonight, will engage in political activity." On Monday the Shah arrived in New York. There were objections in Iran but no reason for alarm about the safety of the Americans there.
Through the State Department I received a series of reports about the Shah. Rockefeller's staff told us that the Shah's lymphoma was a Class III malignancy that may be too advanced to irradiate and that chemotherapy would require a minimum of eight months. His doctor told us the Shah had a fifty-fifty chance to survive the next 18 months; if he did so, he could then live for several more years. Meanwhile, recuperation from his operation would require another two or three weeks' hospitalization. [The Shah died in Egypt on July 27, 1980.]
The Embassy Is Seized
Sunday, Nov. 4,1979, was a date I will never forget.
Early in the morning Brzezinski reported that our embassy in Tehran had been overrun by about 3,000 militants and that 50 or 60 of our American staff had been captured.
Immediately afterward, Vance reviewed with me again the assurances of protection we had received from Iranian officials. We were deeply disturbed, but reasonably confident that the Iranians would soon remove the attackers from the embassy compound and release our people. Never, so far as we knew, had a host government failed to attempt to protect threatened diplomats. We had a firm pledge from both the Iranian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to give our staff and property this protection; during the past week or two, even Khomeini's forces had helped to dispel crowds of demonstrators near the American embassy. Prime Minister Bazargan did his best to keep his word, but after a few hours passed without forceful action we grew increasingly concerned. We contacted officials in the Bazargan Cabinet and within the so-called Revolutionary Council, where govern-ment and religious leaders decided the nation's policies. All our efforts were fruitless. The militants had become overnight heroes, Khomeini praised their action, and no public official was willing to confront them. Bazargan and Yazdi resigned in disgust.
It was not at all clear what the militants wanted. My impression was that originally they had not intended to remain in the embassy or to hold the Americans captive beyond a few hours. However, when they received the adulation of fellow revolutionaries and the support of Khomeini, they prolonged their illegal act. As kidnapers, they seemed to have no clear ideas about ransom, except to demand the return of the Shah and his money.
I wrote in my diary on Nov. 6,1979: "We began to assess punitive action. We still have 570 Americans there. I directed the companies that employed these people to get them out of the country. We also asked the Algerians, Syrians, Turks, Pakistanis, Libyans, P.L.O. and others to intercede. It is almost impossible to deal with a crazy man, except that he does have