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The Shah told Sullivan that he had complete control over the military leaders and that they would make no move to restrain him in any way. He said he planned to leave Iran in order to strengthen Bakhtiar, and that those who had considered a military coup would instead support Bakhtiar's government but would stand by to take over if he should fail. General Huyser reported that the military leaders indeed supported Bakhtiar.
Sullivan apparently lost control of himself, and on Jan. 10 sent a cable bordering on insolence, condemning our asking the French President to contact Khomeini instead of doing it ourselves. He used such phrases as "gross and perhaps irretrievable mistake," "plea for sanity" and "incomprehensible." He seemed unable to present an objective analysis of the situation in Iran. I was well aware that he had been carrying out some of my directives halfheartedly, if at all. Now, since he had changed his mind in recent weeks about supporting the Shah, his activities and statements had cost him much of the confidence he had previously enjoyed from the Shah and his associates—and from me. From then on I relied primarily on General Huyser, who remained cool and competent and, as far as I could tell, always sent back balanced views. (In April of 1979, Sullivan resigned.)
On Jan. 19, more than a million marchers in Iran rallied to back Khomeini. He announced from France that he was forming a provisional government, ending his 15 years of exile and returning to Iran. Bakhtiar then offered to resign and let the Iranian people choose their form of government, provided Khomeini would remain in Paris.
The departure of the Shah from Iran to Egypt and then to Morocco was curiously anticlimactic, because we had been anticipating his move and because the Shah and his retinue wanted it seen as a temporary absence rather than a historic event. Nevertheless, this marked the end of his 38-year reign. Khomeini flew into Tehran on Feb. 1, to be welcomed by hundreds of thousands of supporters.
Americans In Peril
During all this time, we were busy evacuating the many Americans who wanted to leave Iran. Since the beginning of the disturbances, we had brought out more than 25,000, but almost 10,000 were still there. Sullivan now said that all American citizens except diplomatic personnel could no longer be protected and should leave the country. Millions of Iranians were in the streets, and thousands had already been killed in the struggles between the government officials and the Khomeini forces. Almost miraculously, no American had been attacked, in spite of the Ayatullah's picturing us to his supporters as foreign devils.
After a few days, the Iranian military simply disintegrated, and on Feb. 11, Bakhtiar and the members of the Majlis resigned. Mehdi Bazargan then became Prime Minister and, with the support of Khomeini, began to consolidate his authority. He and his predominantly Western-educated Cabinet members cooperated with us. They protected our embassy, provided safe travel for General Philip C. Cast, who had replaced Huyser, and sent us friendly