Jimmy Carter: 444 Days Of Agony

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media missions, had closely studied the degree of vigilance of the captors. The guards had grown lax, and security around the compound was no longer a serious obstacle to a surprise entry by force. Our satellite photographs of the embassy compound and the surrounding area kept us abreast of changes in the habits and composition of the terrorists' guard details.

Life for the guards seemed to have become relaxed and humdrum, perfectly designed for a lightning strike by a highly trained and well-equipped force that, with night-vision devices, could distinguish in the dark between our people and the Iranian captors. We would need six large helicopters to fly into the center of Tehran, pick up the three Americans in the Foreign Ministry building and the other hostages in the embassy, and carry them and the rescue team to safety.

The biggest problem was how to travel the enormous distance from the sea or from other countries to extract the hostages from the center of Tehran. Our solution was to fly in eight helicopters (to provide two backups) from our aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Oman to the remote area now known as Desert One that had been surveyed earlier. The only drawback of this site was the seldom-used dirt country road going by it, but the team was prepared to hold passersby, hide their vehicles and release them when it was too late for the operation to be disrupted. Everyone was under strict orders from me not to harm innocent bystanders was under strict orders from me not to harm innocent bystanders and to avoid bloodshed whenever possible.

The helicopters were scheduled to take off Thursday, April 24, at dusk (10:30 a.m. Washington time) and arrive about six hours later. This 600-mile flight from the Gulf of Oman would push to the limit the capabilities of these aircraft. They would be joined at Desert One by six C-130s carrying the 90 members of the rescue team, plus fuel and supplies. After the team was transferred from the C-130s to the helicopters, the airplanes would leave Iran, and the helicopters with the rescue team would fly a short distance northward into the nearby mountains. They would arrive at about 4 a.m. and be hidden from view the following day. This place was remote and uninhabited, and detection would be highly unlikely. Communication between the Pentagon and the rescue team, using satellites and other relay facilities, would be instantaneous. I would receive telephone reports from General Jones and Harold Brown.

The next night, trucks that our agents had purchased would be removed from a warehouse on the outskirts of Tehran, driven to the mountain hiding place and used to carry the rescue team into the city. At a prearranged time, the rescue team would simultaneously enter the Foreign Ministry building and the compound, overpower the guards and free the hostages.

Guided by radio communications, the helicopters would land at the sites [in Tehran] on prearranged schedules, pick up our people and carry them to an abandoned airstrip near the city. From there, two C-141s would fly the Americans to safety across the desert area of Saudi Arabia. The helicopters would be left in Iran. I planned to notify the Saudis only after the rescue mission was completed.

Vance, worried about the risk to the hostages, was still concerned about whether we should make the rescue effort at all, although he and I had agreed

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