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Until this time, those opposing the Shah had been fragmented. Now an identifiable leader was emerging. Perhaps because of his remoteness and air of martyrdom enhanced by 15 years of exile, his constant and unswerving opposition to the Shah, his religious beliefs bordering on fanaticism and his militant attitude in demanding action and violence, Khomeini had gained increasing influence over the anti-Shah forces. Although he was still in Paris, Khomeini was calling for general strikes, the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of a republic.
Still, there was no question in my mind that the Shah deserved our unequivocal support. Not only had he been a staunch and dependable ally for many years, but he remained the leader around whom we hoped to see a stable and reformed government organized in Iran. We knew little about the forces contending against him, but their anti-American statements were enough to strengthen our resolve to support the Shah.
By early November, Ambassador Sullivan had become convinced that opposition leaders would have to be given a much stronger voice in Iran's affairs than the Shah was willing to consider. I could not disagree, but my basic choice was whether to give the Shah our complete backing in his crisis or to predicate support, as Sullivan increasingly seemed to prefer, on the Shah's acquiescence to suggestions from the American embassy.
The Shah's basic plan of asking one leader to assemble a coalition government seemed sound, but he was having a hard time convincing anyone of stature to serve. At the end of the year, Shahpour Bakhtiar, a Western-educated moderate, accepted the position of Prime Minister. The newly chosen leader demonstrated surprising strength and independence, immediately calling for the Shah to leave Iran, for the secret police to be disbanded, for those responsible for shooting demonstrators to be tried and for civilians to be in charge of Iran's foreign affairs.
It was obvious that the Shah would have to leave the country before order could be restored. However, I agreed with him that he should do so with dignity, in accordance with his own schedule and only after a stable successor government had been established. Sullivan, however, was recommending that we oppose the plans of the Shah, insist on his immediate departure and try to form some kind of friendship or alliance with Khomeini. I rejected this recommendation because the Shah, Bakhtiar and the Iranian military leaders needed consistent American support.
Because Sullivan seemed unable to provide us with adequate reports from the military, a crucial source of information and advice, Defense Secretary Harold Brown and I concluded that we needed a strong and competent American representative in Tehran who would keep me informed about the military's needs. One of his responsibilities would be to strengthen the resolve of the military leaders and encourage them to remain in Iran to maintain stability even if the Shah should leave. I ordered General Robert Huyser, deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe, to carry out this assignment.
Some of Iran's top military leaders had told Sullivan, "We will not permit