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It was obvious to me that the Revolutionary Council would never act and that the hostages were not going to be released. I decided to act. On April 11, my top advisers and I went over the rescue plans again. In the Cabinet Room with me were Mondale, Brown, Brzezinski, Christopher, Central Intelligence Director Stansfield Turner, General David Jones, Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell. (Vance was on a brief and much needed vacation.) Because the militants had threatened to "destroy all the hostages immediately" if any additional moves against them should be launched, we had to plan any action with the utmost care. General Jones said that the earliest date everything could be ready was April 24. I told everyone that it was time for us to bring our hostages home; their safety and our national honor were at stake. When Vance returned, he objected to my decision to rescue the hostages and wanted to present his own views to the National Security Council Group. At a meeting on April 15, he argued that we should be patient and not do anything that might endanger their safety. No one changed his mind.
Disaster in The Desert
We took every possible step to conceal our moves in preparation for the rescue mission, encouraging the few people who had to know about airplane and helicopter movements to believe they might be related to laying mines. On the evening of April 16, we met in the Situation Room for a thorough review of the operation. This session lasted 2½ hours, and I was particularly impressed with Generals James B. Vaught and Philip C. Gast and Colonel Charles Beckwith, who would direct the mission after I authorized it to begin.
In their meticulous description of the operation, I received satisfactory answers to my many questions. I informed the military leaders that they had my complete confidence and support, and I made it clear that there would be no interference from the White House while the mission was under way. However, I wanted to be kept constantly informed.
Although I was concerned about what the future might hold, I had no doubt that the time was ripe. Because I was so clear in my resolve, I looked forward to the mission. The plans and training had been completed; the necessary helicopters and transport planes on American aircraft carriers had been stationed south of Iran or near by in such friendly countries as Oman and Egypt. We did not notify the leaders of these countries about the purpose of our visits, letting observers surmise that they involved aid to Afghan freedom fighters or some kind of mining operation along Iran's coast.
We had blueprints of our embassy buildings in Tehran, of course, and we had talked to the black and female hostages re-leased before Christmas, although they were unable to tell us much about the others. Much more important, we received information from someone (who cannot be identified) who was thoroughly familiar with the compound, knew where every hostage was located, how many and what kind of guards were there at different times and the daily schedule of the hostages and their captors. This was the first time we knew the precise location of the Americans.
Our agents, who moved freely in and out of Tehran under the guise of business or