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My briefings revealed that despite increases in Iran's standard of living from oil revenues, the Shah's pursuit of his own goals had engendered opposition from the intelligentsia and others who desired more participation in the political processes of Iran. I was informed that there were 2,500 (the Shah said "below 2,500") political prisoners in the Iranian jails. The Shah was convinced that immediate suppression was the best response to opposition, and he was somewhat scornful of Western leaders (including me) who did not emulate his tactics.
In my small private room near the Oval Office, I asked if I might speak frankly, and he agreed. "I am familiar with the great improvements which have been made in your country," I told him, "but I also know about some of the problems. You have heard of my statements about human rights. A growing number of your own citizens are claiming that these rights are not always honored in Iran. I understand that most of the disturbances have arisen among the mullahs and other religious leaders, the new middle class searching for more political influence, and students in Iran and overseas. Iran's reputation is being damaged. Can anything be done to alleviate this problem by closer consultation with the dissident groups and by easing off on some of the strict police policies?"
The Shah paused for a few moments before he replied somewhat sadly, "No, there is nothing I can do. I must enforce the Iranian laws, which are designed to combat Communism. This is a very real and dangerous problem for Iran, and, indeed, for the other countries in my area and in the Western world. It may be that when this serious menace is removed, the laws can be changed, but that will not be soon. In any case, the complaints and recent disturbances originate among the very troublemakers against whom the laws have been designed to protect our country. They are really just a tiny minority, and have no support among the vast majority of Iranian people."
Ten months after that exchange, on Sept. 8, 1978, the Shah declared martial law throughout Iran. A bloody confrontation between the police and a large crowd of demonstrating Muslims followed. Several hundred people were killed by bursts of machine-gun fire. After this, the strength of the demonstrators grew as they demanded the Shah's abdication and he attempted to control the disorders with ever more stringent military discipline.
At times, the Shah tried to pacify the dissidents. He granted amnesty to hundreds of opposition leaders—including Muslim leader Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had recently moved from Iraq to Paris. Yet his problems mounted.
Frequent reports from our embassy in Iran indicated the gravity of the Shah's troubles. Still, Ambassador William Sullivan joined all my other advisers and me in believing that the Shah was our best hope for maintaining stability in Iran.
The Shah was trying to decide whether to set up an interim government, set up a military government or even abdicate. We encouraged him to hang firm and to count on our backing.
However, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Shah was no longer functioning as a strong leader, but was growing despondent and unsure of himself. I knew he needed all the