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Détente—and linkage—broke down primarily because of Soviet excesses but also because some promised American carrots were not delivered. (For example, Congress overrode the Nixon Administration's recommendation on most-favored-nation trading status for the U.S.S.R.) When American inducements were made less tempting to the Kremlin, many of the same benefits became available elsewhere—technology from Japan, grain from Argentina, electronic products and computer equipment from France. Today Soviet officials say privately that the Politburo's decision to step up its African activities in 1975 was made easier by the fiasco over the Jackson Amendment, and that the decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 was made easier by the fact that SALT II already seemed doomed in the Senate.
Since Afghanistan, the U.S. has pretty much thrown away its carrots—SALT, grain sales, cultural exchanges, etc.—and resorted exclusively to waving sticks (and not very big ones at that). President Reagan has expressed a preference for open, Jackson-style, quid pro quo linkage. Henry Kissinger criticized this approach in the mid-'70s, but has now endorsed the Administration's position. He was right the first time.
I he U.S. should take the lead in trying to restore détente.
Bringing tensions between the superpowers back under control is a challenge to American policy that carries with it an unavoidable inequity. Because of the Soviet Union's interventions in Africa and Afghanistan, its saber rattling in Eastern Europe, its support for Vietnamese aggression in Southeast Asia, and its menacing buildup in nuclear and conventional weaponry, the U.S.S.R. is largely responsible for the crisis in East-West relations. Yet if the U.S. waits for the Kremlin to make the first move in getting the relationship back on track, and especially on the right terms, it may well have to wait much longer than it wants to or should have to.
The sophisticated qualities necessary for the prudent exercise of power and intelligent management of international relations—notably moral authority, self-confidence, respect for the rule of law, and political finesse—are stunted in the Soviet system and psychology. The present downward spiral of mutual mistrust and recrimination will clearly not lead to an inevitable nuclear apocalypse, but it can do a lot of damage just the same. It increases the difficulties and dangers involved in virtually every other international problem the U.S. faces. It thus follows that after a suitable interval the U.S. should take the initiative in statesmanship with the U.S.S.R.—not, certainly, to make concessions but as a pragmatic first step in its own self-interest.
The most obvious and appropriate area for the U.S. to make the first move in restoring détente is also both controversial and politically difficult: arms control. Jimmy Carter tried but failed to protect SALT from becoming a hostage to the overall climate of the superpower relationship. That failure resulted partly from the widespread impression that he naively viewed arms control as an enterprise distinct from—and more righteous than —defense and national security. As long as the arms controllers stereotype themselves as peace-loving good guys vs. the warmongering bad guys of the Pentagon,