To Rebuild the Image

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tactical weapon claim it is more "unmoral" than other nuclear bombs, partly because it can kill people without destroying buildings or vehicles, and partly because it is easy to use. The accusations do not make sense, since the weapons might actually help deter a Soviet armored blitz against Western Europe and thus diminish the danger of war. The real problem with the neutron bomb is essentially political: because of internal opposition in a number of European countries to the stationing of new U.S. weapons on their soil, the key NATO allies are likely to continue to resist deployment of the neutron bomb.

Most critical of all is the Soviet conventional buildup. Not only has the U.S.S.R. acquired a lead of 50,000 to 10,900 over the U.S. in tanks, 62,000 to 22,000 in armored fighting vehicles and 3.6 million to the U.S.'s 2 million in men under arms, it has also developed an air- and sea-lift capacity to project its forces around the globe. This Soviet superiority must be countered by a substantial buildup of U.S. conventional forces (see box).

I he U.S. should have a greater capacity to react against Soviet-inspired subversion, which means removing some restraints on covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The sinister handmaiden of Soviet military adventurism has been covert action and mischief-making by proxy. There are widespread reports, for example, that the Soviets encouraged Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in his recent annexation of the central African nation of Chad. Libya has long been a conduit for Soviet arms to the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as revolutionary groups in the Philippines, Chile and Turkey. Congress should repeal or amend legislation that limits the ability of the CIA to conduct clandestine operations abroad.

As long as the Soviets countenance aggression by their surrogates, there is no reason why the U.S. should be hindered in helping to supply the guerrilla groups in Afghanistan and the non-Communist resistance to the Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia. Soviet planners, poring over their maps in search of targets of opportunity, should have to reckon with the likelihood that the MiGs they have supplied to some would-be invader will encounter U.S.-made surface-to-air missiles. Moscow's cloak-and-dagger agents, bagmen and propagandists should also have to contend with American operatives trying to organize pro-Western political forces. When that day comes, Thailand will be less likely to go the way of Cambodia, Niger the way of Chad, or Oman the way of South Yemen. Clearly stated declarations of U.S. commitments and vital interests would inject some uncertainty—and possibly some additional caution—into Soviet calculations.

Recent expansions of Soviet power have flagrantly jeopardized Western interests and intimidated Western friends in many regions. What is equally significant, though far less noticed, is that none of those interventions has risked a direct confrontation with the U.S. In every instance, the Soviets have moved where they were sure they would not encounter American forces or hit an American trip wire. Thus Soviet adventurism has confirmed, somewhat paradoxically, that the old men in the Kremlin are still conservative, even when throwing their weight around the world. They are willing to weather diplomatic outrage and embargoes and