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There is no sure way to protect foreign policy from meddling and obstructionism by congressional cliques. U.S. diplomacy, however, would almost automatically become more consistent, credible and effective if Congress, at its own initiative, demonstrated discipline and bipartisanship in offering advice and consent to the Executive Branch. The new Administration, in turn, could help by being more solicitous and skillful in its liaison with Capitol Hill than has recently been the case.
The Secretary of State should be given greater authority and responsibility than he has had in the immediate past. As the senior Cabinet officer, the Secretary of State is considered first among equals in various councils and committees. But that arrangement still leaves too much room for bureaucratic and personal rivalries; it also too often puts the Secretary of State hi the position of representing his own department's sometimes parochial interests against those of Defense, Treasury or Commerce. One solution would be for the Secretary of State to wear a second hat, analogous to the CIA director's additional title of Director of Central Intelligence, which charges him with coordinating the intelligence work of the entire Government.
As chairman of an interagency Cabinet-level body, the Secretary of State would have formal supervisory power over any activity by any Government department that has consequences beyond the water's edge. Reagan's National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, has promised that his office would return "the functions of formulating and implementing policy" to appropriate departments. That vow, if kept, would go a long way toward ending the who's-in-charge confusion that at tended U.S. policymaking during the Vance-Brzezinski and Rogers-Kissin ger years.
The U.S. must attract more and better young officers into its diplomatic corps and intelligence services. That means raising both pay scales and mo rale; it also means increasing the size and quality of the talent pool from which those services draw. There is a desperate need for a new commitment by Government and the private sec tor alike to foreign-language and area-studies programs in high schools and colleges. However far removed this is sue may seem from the crisis of the mo ment in the Persian Gulf or Eastern Europe, the ability of the U.S. to deal with those regions ten or 20 years from now will depend hi part on the vigor of Arabic and Slavic studies around the country. A presidential commission correctly concluded hi 1979 that "American incompetence in foreign languages is nothing short of scandal ous and it is becoming worse." One so bering example: when a Soviet soldier hi Afghanistan briefly sought asylum at the U.S. embassy hi Kabul last Sep tember, not one American official there could communicate with the would-be defector in Russian.
An urgent problem affecting both foreign and defense pol icy is the degree of alarm that has characterized domestic crit icism of