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Preserving parity will be difficult enough. The balance of strategic forces is already being eroded, principally by the U.S.S.R.'s ongoing ICBM buildup. For some years Western experts have been concerned that the land-based portion of the American strategic deterrent—1,052 Minuteman and Titan II missiles in underground silos—might soon be susceptible to a surprise first strike by the Soviet Union's own increasingly accurate, destructive and numerous land-based warheads. Such a pre-emptive blow, if successful, would seriously weaken the ability of the U.S. to retaliate with iCBMs against Soviet military targets. The worry is this: faced with the awful choice of responding with an attack against Soviet cities—thereby inviting a Soviet "second strike" against U.S. cities—an American President might decide to capitulate instead. Whether a Soviet leader would ever take the gamble of trying to paralyze the U.S. in this way is almost beside the point. Perceptions, especially those about credibility, are the essence of deterrence. SALT II is in the best interest of the U.S.
The SALT agreements on offensive weapons, signed in 1912 and 1919, set modest but helpful bounds on the strategic arms race and high but still useful ceilings on the number of missile launchers and warheads that the Soviets could deploy. The agreements also establish some important rules for verification—that is, the ability of each side to monitor the testing and deployment of the other side's most dangerous weapons. SALT I expired 3% years ago, and SALT II has not been ratified—a victim both of mismanagement by the Carter Administration and of senatorial anger over Soviet intervention in Africa and Afghanistan.
The Reagan Administration is considering whether to renegotiate SALT II in a way that will allow it to replace Carter's imprimatur with its own or whether to let it die. It should definitely try to revive the treaty, and the less renegotiation the better, since the agreement as it stands represents a sound compromise. The treaty would not, as some critics have charged, lock the U.S. into a position of inferiority. There are things in SALT II that the U.S. does not like. There are things in it that the Soviets do not like. SALT II, among its other advantages, imposes realistic constraints on the most threatening Soviet weapons, ICBMs with multiple warheads. These Soviet MlRVed ICBMs represent the cutting edge of the strategic nuclear challenge to the U.S. since their warheads might render the American deterrent vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, at least in the calculations of many defense planners. The treaty, moreover, does not prevent the U.S. from developing and deploying new weapons that will be necessary to keep pace with the Soviets. If the U.S. tries to extract too many additional concessions from the Soviets, it is all but certain to jeopardize the useful rules and limits already established.
Despite SALT n's relegation to legislative limbo, both sides are still abiding by its main provisions, as well as those of SALT I. The Reagan Administration should quickly seek to extend this informal adherence until new negotiations get under way. Reason: before the U.S. could decide