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Kremlinologists are certain that Moscow factions are at odds over how to respond to Nixon's long reach toward the East. The hardliners, it is felt, are arguing that the U.S. has shown its true colors, cannot be trusted, so why seek Soviet-American agreements on strategic arms or accommodations with the West on Berlin or mutual troop reductions in Europe? With Chou scheduled to visit several Balkan countries, including Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania, this fall, Moscow is expected to demand more discipline from its Eastern satellites so as to discourage any new drift toward China. The U.S. move may thus inadvertently make life tougher for some of the most independent-minded Communist leaders.
Yet in the main arena, the Kremlin's more practical and progressive leaders are expected to win out. Rather than withdraw and isolate itself as China did, the U.S.S.R. will probably resume its peace offensive and compete for influence in the West. These Soviet leaders consider arms limitations too advantageous to pass up. Besides, they have no desire to antagonize both China and the U.S. For them, the possibility of an eventual two-front war is unthinkable. The first real sign of which way the U.S.S.R. will go may come in the resumed SALT talks. An intriguing side issue is how long Peking can continue to accuse Moscow of cozying up to the U.S., while claiming for itself the role of the only pure Marxist foe of American imperialism. The Washington-Peking rapprochement may well disillusion the New Left everywhere; this could benefit Moscow in its ideological competition with Peking.
The impact on Japan is also a weighty U.S. consideration. While Japan's largest daily, Asahi Shimbun, called the Nixon trip "the diplomatic coup of the century," the Sato government was stunned that it had not been consulted by its friends on a matter so vital to its own backyard. Japan is still wary of its huge neighbor—and, in part, held back from more contacts with China by U.S. pressure. The Japanese government will only be able to look wistfully at the sight of a U.S. President in Peking, when leftist agitation makes it almost impossible for one to visit otherwise far friendlier Tokyo.
What does China gain from all this? A great deal, at little cost to itself. Certainly, Peking acquires a new aura as a skillful operator in world affairs, new strength and leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. Chairman Mao, at 77 an aging revolutionary with limited years of power remaining, may be on the verge of a final ambition: to unite Taiwan and the mainland once more.