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Responding with more excitement than hostility, the rest of the world may take weeks or months to absorb the diplomatic turn and simmer down. Taiwan, of course, felt sorely threatened by the new U.S. coziness with Chinese Communism, fearing—with good reason —that its interests would be sacrificed. Ambassador James Shen, complaining publicly of "a shabby deal," lodged a strong private protest in Washington; a Taipei statement said that Nationalist China was still determined "to recover the Chinese mainland" and would never "yield to any pressure or violence." Japan, which sees itself as the dominant resident power in Asia, expressed public approval but private reservations about China's implicit challenge to its ties to the U.S. South Korea, still facing Communist troops to its north, also protested—and proclaimed a day of mourning for Taiwan. Obviously worried but gamely approving were South Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu and Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam, who said: "We did not expect the [Nixon] visit, but one day we have to normalize relations even with our foes." Moscow, the power that stands to lose most from any collaboration between its two principal antagonists, so far has remained ominously quiet. Tass played the story straight, offering no comment.
Yet most world capitals were ecstatic. In Paris, France-Soir bannered the announcement LE COUP DE NIXON and declared that Nixon's decision "turns the international situation topsy-turvy" and "may soon bring peace without capitulation or humiliation for anyone." Rome's Italian state radio called the news clamoroso, while South Africa's Johannesburg Star hailed the development as "the most needed move forward in the world's painful crawl toward assured peace."
Worldwide speculation soared over the timing of the Nixon-Chou agreement, the amazing success in keeping all the arrangements so secret and the possible concessions each side may have made in order to make the Peking summit possible. U.S. officials declined to illuminate these shadows. Only a dozen men in the entire Administration had been aware of the plans to send Kissinger to Peking. They included Secretary of State William Rogers and several of his assistants, Kissinger and three of his aides, and Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to Saigon. Among those kept in the dark were Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Vice President Spiro Agnew.
Switching Signals