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Above all, the meeting could lead to a resolution of the long and bloody nightmare of the Viet Nam War. The meeting could help solve—however slowly —other specific problems that have kept China and the U.S. from dealing civilly with each other: the status of Chiang's government on Taiwan, the admission of Peking to the United Nations, the establishment of diplomatic relations. The unprecedented 16 hours of reasonable and unpolemic talks between Kissinger and Chou and the resulting invitation to Nixon suggested that some progress had already been made on most of those topics. Otherwise neither side could hold much expectation of achieving warmer relations at the summit level.
Far more personally for Richard Nixon, the embattled U.S. President stands a chance to emerge as a peacemaker —in time for a needed boost in popularity before he faces a tough re-election campaign in the fall of 1972. It would be ironic—and yet appropriate —if the man who launched a political career largely on the basis of his fervent anti-Communism were to cap it by establishing himself as a leader who helped move the capitalist and Communist worlds toward a historic rapprochement. The shift in Nixon's attitudes has been gradual but dazzling. During the Korean War, he urged the bombing of China; less than two years ago, Peking leaders assailed Nixon as "a cunning and crafty swindler and a murderer." Yet he soon may be applauded in the streets of Peking, walk through the Gate of Heavenly Peace and dine with Mao and Chou.
To be sure, much could still go wrong. There is no certainty that any of the high expectations will be achieved. Obviously, unforeseen events could prevent the meeting; Dwight Eisenhower's 1960 summit with Russia was thwarted when the Communists downed an American U-2 reconnaissance plane, and Lyndon Johnson's similar hopes were dashed in 1968 by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. The biggest threat to Nixon's trip would seem to be the uncertain status of the Viet Nam War. If the U.S. troop withdrawal program lags or the U.S. finds it necessary to resume massive bombing of North Viet Nam, the Chinese may renege on their invitation.
If the trip does come off, there is always the possibility of a fundamental —or even temperamental—disagreement that could deliver a crushing blow to the world's newly aroused hopes. Warns Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan: "The American people must not expect too much too fast. We are still too hung up on
China—either we hate her or we love her; we respond either with hostility or excitement."