(5 of 10)
It was during last April that Nixon plunged into the intensive study culminating in the Kissinger trip. Total secrecy was imposed in order to give both sides ample room for maneuver and a chance to escape from the enterprise without embarrassment. For fear of possible leaks, Nixon and Kissinger did not work on the project in the Oval Office, where the President sees many visitors daily, but in the more secluded Lincoln Room. Though China experts were aware of a major policy review, they were kept in the dark. In fact, the community of Sinologists grumbled that Nixon was not properly following up his contacts with Peking.
Great Impact
Thus Kissinger was able to embark on his diplomatic adventure—a five-nation trip ostensibly related to the war in Viet Nam—and to fly into Peking from Pakistan without arousing suspicion, while pretending to be ill with a stomach ailment (see box, page 13). He arrived in Peking fully aware that Chou was more than willing to see Nixon. But just what the Kissinger-Chou talks produced that convinced both sides that they would benefit from a summit meeting remains one of the mysteries surrounding the affair. Uncertainty that matters would go smoothly was undoubtedly a reason for all of the secrecy; if they had not, the resulting publicity could have produced a disillusionment that would have prevented another attempt later.
The extraordinary Nixon-Kissinger diplomatic venture is certain to have a great impact on at least three specific issues:
THE WAR. In his announcement, the President did not mention Viet Nam, but it is inconceivable that his trip is not related to a potential settlement. To that end, the mere opening of direct communication with Peking could prove immensely helpful. Even if it wanted to, China could not force Hanoi to negotiate realistically toward a settlement that would be face-saving for both sides. Hanoi clings stubbornly to its independence and can always look toward Moscow to fill in military supplies that Peking might cut off. Yet China remains influential because of its current and past help to Hanoi in the war. China watchers are increasingly convinced that Peking's leaders are tired of this drain on their time, money and materiel and are eager to concentrate on building their economy—and confronting some 400,000 Soviet troops poised near their borders. Moreover, they no longer fear that the U.S. will emerge from the war in any position that would seriously embarrass the Communist forces.
It is likely Kissinger assured Chou that the U.S. would stick to its withdrawal plans and might well have ceased all active combat missions by the time Nixon goes to Peking. In return, Chou may have agreed to press Hanoi to seek a settlement short of a takeover of South Viet Nam—in the confidence that this would eventually happen anyway. Chou probably promised Kissinger that China would be willing to take part in a new Geneva-style conference to seek a negotiated settlement of the entire Southeast Asia conflict, thus taking the initiative away from the U.S.S.R. Chou conveyed such a willingness to a visiting Australian official last week.