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Soon Reagan called. In fact, he was able to explain the misunderstanding. He regarded the new arrangement as a mere housekeeping detail, a formality. Lack of communication, aggravated by staff mischief, was the root problem. I was convinced that Ed Meese had been as misled as the President. The trouble lay elsewhere in the President's staff.
Reagan said that he had received complaints from other Cabinet officers about "steamroller tactics" in connection with issues that interested me. Perhaps the President agreed with them.
"Do we have different conceptions of what your foreign policy should be, Mr. President?" I asked.
Reagan, exasperated, raised his voice. "Damn it, Al," he said, "we have the same views, and I need you!"
A few days later—at 2:35 p.m. on Monday, March 30—the State Department command center informed me that the television networks were reporting that a gunman had fired shots at President Reagan as he left the Washington Hilton Hotel but that the President had escaped injury. I picked up a telephone connected to a direct White House line. James Baker told me that the first report was inaccurate. The President had been struck "in the back" by a bullet. "It looks quite serious," Baker said. "I'm going to the hospital."
Vice President Bush was in Texas. "I will move immediately to the White House," I said. Baker agreed. "You will be my point of contact."
In my car, my mind filled with memories of the day on which President Kennedy was assassinated and the sense of shock and sorrow that overcame the nation. Now the terrible blow had fallen again. On arrival at the White House, I learned that all the President's senior aides had rushed to the hospital. "Has the Vice President been informed?" I asked. The answer was no. Bush was airborne, flying from Dallas to Austin. I telephoned him on his plane and recommended he return to Washington at once. To Allen, I suggested that the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General and the director of Central Intelligence be asked to join Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, who was already present, Allen and me in the Situation Room.
Weinberger and Casey were the last to arrive. Each member of the crisis team in ,his turn gave the newcomers a report on his activities. Weinberger seemed somewhat selfconscious. Perhaps he was embarrassed by his late arrival. Abruptly, he said, "I have raised the alert status of our forces."
I was shocked. Any such change would be detected promptly by the Soviet Union. In response, the Russians might raise their own alert status, and that could cause a further escalation on our side. The news would exacerbate the existing climate of anxiety and anger and fear. Moreover, the Soviet leaders might very well conclude that the U.S., in a flight of paranoia, believed that the U.S.S.R. was involved in the attempt to assassinate the President. Why would we alert our military forces if a lone psychotic had been responsible?
"Cap," I said, "what do you mean? Will you please tell us exactly what you've done." He had some difficulty specifying. This was natural enough: he had been Secretary of Defense for barely 70 days, hardly long