Alexander Haig

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the New York Times I discovered that my "take-charge" style had earned me the nickname CINC-WORLD, or Commander in Chief of the World. From other reports, it appeared that I had raised hackles by pointing out the foreign policy implications of the grain embargo and auto imports, by reassuring our allies on our plans with respect to the neutron bomb and by the nature of my personality. The fanciful story about my thrusting a "20-page memorandum" into Reagan's hands as he returned from his swearing-in took root in the press and demonstrated once again that gossip is hardier than truth. Again I called up Meese. "Al," he said, "it's just newspaper talk. Don't pay any attention." Baker gave me the same advice.

The day after the Inauguration, Haig was struck once again by the behavior of the White House staff, particularly during the very first formal meeting of the Cabinet.

Of the many destructive effects of Viet Nam and Watergate, none is worse than the tendency of a new Administration to believe that history began on its Inauguration Day, and its predecessor was totally wrong about everything, and that all its acts must therefore be canceled. This produces a policy of recrimination rather than a policy of renewal; it causes men and women to look back in anger rather than to look forward in hope and confidence.

President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan once remarked that being the friend of the U.S. is like living on the banks of a great river: the soil is wonderfully fertile and there are many other benefits, but every four years or eight years, the river, flooded by storms that are too far away to be seen, changes its course, and you are left in a desert, all alone. These irrational changes, of course, produced by a political vengefulness that is alien to American life, are a great danger. They confuse our friends, mislead our adversaries and confound our own plans for a more manageable world.

It seemed important to establish, early in Reagan's presidency, that smallness of spirit would not be his way. Yet the day after the Inauguration, it was suggested in the Oval Office that the agreement with the Iranians for the return of the hostages, negotiated by the Carter Administration, be abrogated. This amazing proposition won the support of many in the room. Insofar as Jim Baker's reaction could be interpreted, he appeared to be in sympathy. So did Deaver. The President did not seem to be surprised by the suggestion; evidently he was prepared, in his remarkable equanimity, to listen to the most audacious ideas. I had to say that I was appalled that such a cynical action could even be considered. The agreement, however bitter, however deeply flawed, was a pledge of the honor of the U.S. Government. We just couldn't go back on it. Again, the President, in his quietude, was nodding agreement, but he made no decision, listening instead to both views with impartial receptivity. In the end, the agreement with Iran was honored.

I may have snatched the issue of the Iranian agreements out of the White House staffs hands a bit too brusquely. But their style was new to me; I had never encountered anything quite like it. Earlier that day, the first Cabinet meeting had been held. On entering the Cabinet room, I saw that Meese and Baker were seated at the Cabinet table. This was a startling departure from

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