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Castro ordered antiaircraft guns placed on the roofs of Havana during our naval exercises. The flow of arms into Nicaragua and thence into El Salvador slackened, a signal from Havana and Moscow that they had received and understood the American message. From many sources we heard that the Cuban was nervous, that he desired contacts with the Americans.
In late February, one of Richard Allen's staff assistants, Roger Fontaine, took the unusual step of trying to arrange a meeting with Castro through Jack Anderson, the columnist. Anderson, it seems, knew a Cuban exile in Miami who claimed to have arranged for the passing of messages between the Castro regime and previous U.S. Administrations. Fontaine met the Cuban in Anderson's office. The question of opening a secret channel to Havana was discussed. The President's name was invoked.
When word of this reached me, I telephoned Meese, Allen's effective superior, to talk about its implications. We had spent weeks putting fear into the hearts of the Cubans and getting results. This diversion undermined the whole effort. Meese seemed to understand my objections. The President could not have been aware of this, he said; he had told Allen not to meet with foreigners without prior clearance from the State Department.
Castro's approaches became more frequent. Finally, it began to seem that nothing could be lost by testing the waters. On Nov. 23, the Cuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and I met in Mexico City, in strictest secrecy and with President Reagan's approval. Rodriguez seemed less a fearsome revolutionary than a cosmopolitan member of the privileged classes. Educated by the Jesuits, a Castroite from the first days, a trusted collaborator of the Soviet Union, he is probably the guarantee in human form that the Cuban revolution will outlive Castro.
The last thing Cuba wanted, Rodriguez said, was a confrontation with the U.S. The U.S. was mistaken, even irrational, to think that Cuba was involved in El Salvador. Cuba could not renounce its right to solidarity with revolutionary masses elsewhere in the world, but Cuba did not want a confrontation by mistake.
Clearly the Cubans were very anxious. Actually, Castro and Rodriguez had more reason to be nervous than they knew. In my conversations with Dobrynin, I continued to press the question of Cuban adventurism. Dobrynin's response convinced me that Cuban activities in the Western Hemisphere were a matter between the U.S. and Cuba. Castro had fallen between two superpowers.
"I'm in Control Here'
In a severe crisis, the fate of the nation is at stake, and the ultimate crisis manager must be the President. In 1973, during the October War, the U.S. received an ultimatum from the Soviet Union: either the Israeli forces that were driving across the Sinai withdraw, or the U.S.S.R. would intervene, possibly with airborne troops. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, suggested to me that this crisis could be managed in the State Department. As the White House chief of staff, I insisted, on instructions from the President, that it must be brought under control by the President, in the White House, with the