Alexander Haig

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support of State and other agencies. The Soviet challenge was handled in the West Wing Situation Room of the White House. U.S. strategic forces went to a higher state of readiness, a strong reply to the Soviet ultimatum was sent to Moscow, and the President won out. In the Reagan Administration, I envisaged the State Department providing whatever assistance the President required in the area of crisis management, in support of whatever system he decided he wanted to use. But no pre-eminent role was even sought for the State Department or the Secretary of State.

On March 22,1981,1 read on the front page of the Washington Post an article that quoted senior White House officials saying that Vice President Bush would be in charge of a new structure for national-security crisis management. To place a Vice President in charge of crisis management would be a departure, but the vice presidency can be almost anything the President wants it to be. Nixon, who literally "learned" the presidency in eight years under Eisenhower, isolated Spiro Agnew as if he were a bacillus. In at least one White House meeting that I attended, President Johnson allotted the loquacious Hubert Humphrey five minutes in which to speak ("Five minutes, Hubert!"); then Johnson stood by, eyes fixed on the sweep-second hand of his watch, while Humphrey spoke, and when the Vice President went over the limit, pushed him, still talking, out of the room.

Reagan, on the other hand, respected Bush's experience and listened to his views. I phoned Ed Meese on Monday morning and asked if there was any truth in the article in the Post. "None whatsoever," Meese replied.

Subsequently Reagan called me into the Oval Office. He wore an expression of concern. "I want you to know," he said, "that the story in the Post is a fabrication. It means that George would sit in for me in the NSC in my absence, and that's all it means. It doesn't affect your authority in any way." Later that same day, he called me on the phone, evidently to reassure me a second time: "Al, I want you to know that you are my foreign policy guy." One hour later the President's press secretary made a statement formally confirming that Bush would indeed chair the Administration's "crisis management" team.

This was a stunning sequence of events. I called in my deputy, William Clark, who knew the mind of the President. "Something is wrong here," he said. "The President wouldn't do a thing like this. Let me go over to the White House and find out what happened."

I called my wife; she had already heard the news on television. "Don't unpack, honey," I told her with forced cheeriness. That night I slept fitfully. There were no more calls from the President, and no word from Bill Clark.

The following morning I began dictating the draft of a letter of resignation, although I did not sign it. The possibility that matters could be explained still existed. Word of my "threat to resign" quickly leaked to the press. I called Vice President Bush. "The American people can't be served by this," I told him. "Of course you chair the NSC in the President's absence. We didn't need to say it. I have been dealt with duplicitously, George. The President has been used. I need a public