(6 of 6)
Hull (said the Board) had to share in the blame because his Nov. 26 "ultimatum" to the Japanese, delivered when the Army and Navy were desperately playing for time, had "hastened" the onslaught. Hull's note was no ultimatum (it was his last word). But (said the Board) "it is significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call on Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941."
In general, by the Army Board's account, liaison in Washington between the War, Navy and State Department heads and the two chiefs of the Army & Navy was close. There were constant huddles and exchanges of information. It was mostly on the second level of bureaucracy. i.e., Army & Navy top levels, that orders got confused and lost.
The Army Board's findings, especially, had scared up some big game, raised some big issues. Army & Navymen joined generally in emotions ranging from anger to regret that able George Marshall had been hit in the fire, even though his distinguished record could stand it. But in general they parted on another, more important issue.
The Army Board had gone out of its way to light up the muddle made by divided command—an issue more important than its showing that stupidity had been countenanced and even rewarded, that military intelligence had been mishandled. The proposal to combine all U.S. fighting services in one department —which the Army advocates, the Navy mortally hates & fears—was before Congress. The Army Board had already made the first cogent argument in the debate.
* Navymen in Washington doubt there were that many planes.