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Keep Calm. Short's greatest concern at the time was not the possibility of an attack from the sea but of sabotage by Japanese on the island; 37% of Hawaii's population were of Japanese origin. Short thought one way to avoid stirring up the population was to betray no anxiety, which alerts and maneuvers might have done. This, in spite of the fact that Honolulu newspapers at the time were screaming: "JAPANESE MAY STRIKE, OVER WEEKEND"—"U.S. ARMY ALERTED IN MANILA, SINGAPORE MOBILIZING AS WAR TENSION GROWS"—"PACIFIC ZERO HOUR NEAR."
Short decided that an anti-sabotage alert was enough. This was the position in which the Jap carrier planes found him, with his planes parked wing-to-wing on the airstrips and his guards on the qui vive for saboteurs.
On Oct. 28, Marshall "clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. . . ."
Let's Not Be Offensive. Short arrived in Hawaii with specific instructions from Marshall to get along with the Navy. Marshall, grieved to find "old Army and Navy feuds" still persisting, wrote Short: "We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned."
Short obediently resolved to get along. His and Kimmel's relations were cordial—despite a subsequent Collier's article by President (then Senator) Harry Truman, which represented the two as scarcely speaking.
But when it came to exchanging vital information, the two commands might as well have been at the opposite poles. One reason was the proud and peculiar Navy:
"Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good will of the Navy which he was charged with securing."
Another reason was service red tape. Another was the complex Navy command setup in which Kimmel held two positions, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch held four (including command of the 14th Naval District), and a many-hatted Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger held six. "Under such circumstances," said the Board, "The Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility."
Inherent Weaknesses. There was a "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" and an "Air Agreement" by which Army & Navy would divide responsibilities, come the attack. "The inherent weakness . . . was the fact of their [the plans] not being operative in time to meet the attack. . . . Unity of command in Washington would have been a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii."
The Navy, which said that it would conduct distance reconnaissance, failed to inform Short that it was doing no such thing. Short never bothered to check up.