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The force struck. Adjacent to Pearl Harbor, mother submarines launched two-man subs. From a point due north of Oahu, carriers launched some 300 planes piloted by the best of Jap naval aviators. For the Japs it was a long chance, but well worth the gamble. Below them lay the Americans, who "had gambled upon having time for preparation that did not exist."
The manner in which the U.S. had gambled was the chief subject of both Army & Navy reports.
Navy Court of Inquiry. In a long, detailed and milky-mild document, the Navy three-man court made it clear why "Betty" Stark should at least share the blame with Kimmel.
Stark had failed to give Kimmel all the information at hand on Jap intentions. Stark had even written Kimmel (in a personal letter) on Oct. 17: "I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us." Stark's messages had "directed Kirnmel's attention toward the Far East" as the most probable Jap target if they should attack, rather than toward Hawaii; this was the conviction also generally held in Washington.
Actually the Navy court wound up by exonerating Kimmel, who would stand cleared were it not for sharply worded addenda by Fleet Admiral Ernest King and Navy Secretary Forrestal. Strongly dissenting, both declined to let Husband Kimmel off the hook.
Kimmel had enough information (said King) to make him aware of the need to take extraordinary measures. His preparations were little more than routine. He could have maintained some kind of longdistance air reconnaissance, even with the few patrol planes (69) he had.
In the Navy's book of futures (Forrestal noted) it was written down that a declaration of war might be preceded by: "1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, 2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, 3) a combination of these two." And yet, even on Dec. 2, when Kimmel's Fleet Intelligence officer told him he had suddenly lost track of four Jap carriers (which they were checking on by radio). Kimmel was not alarmed.
The officer, Captain Edwin T. Layton, testified: "Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat of a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know?' or words to that effect."
Whatever the mannerly Navy court thought, Forrestal and King were sternly convinced, and ruled that both Kimmel and Stark were guilty of "faults of omission" and unfit to hold "any position in the U.S. Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment." Both officers' careers were thus ignominiously ended.
The Army Board. There was nothing mannerly about the Army's report. Roughshod and ungrammatical, it repeated itself like a garrulous, angry man. But there was no doubting its earnestness. Exhaustively it recounted the story of the eleven months which preceded war—a tragic, sometimes ludicrous story of doodling and unawareness.
Walter Short arrived in Hawaii in February to take command. The nation's outpost was woefully deficient. Hawaii needed aircraft, artillery, searchlights, roads, bombproofing, engineer troops, more airfields for dispersion of planes, aircraft warning systems.