(5 of 6)
The Navy (and Washington) failed to inform Short when, "on or about Nov. 25," intelligence sources reported the presence in the Marshall Islands of a large part of the Jap fleet. The Navy failed to inform Short that it had sunk a Jap submarine in outer Pearl Harbor at about 6:30 a.m. on Dec. 7—a sure sign that attack was imminent.
As for intelligence—the Japanese Consul sent Tokyo detailed reports of naval and military activities at Pearl Harbor, transmitting them in code over regular commercial cable lines. The messages were safe from the scrutiny of U.S. officials because the FBI was prevented by "Government regulations" from tapping cables.
The FBI was allowed to tap telephone wires and did. On Dec. 5 agents overheard an "apparently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious" telephone message from a Japanese newspaper woman to Tokyo. The FBI passed the message on to Military Intelligence, which submitted it to General Short at 6 o'clock on Dec. 6. "As Short was unable to decipher the meaning," said the Board, "he did nothing about it and went on to a party."
Days before the attack, Jap midget submarines operated inside the Pearl Harbor nets, plotting the mooring locations of U.S. battleships.
War Games. Washington's responsibility in the whole matter will be argued for a long time, was being hotly argued this week. Up until almost the very end, Washington was convinced that the attack would be made in the Far East. Curiously, in their war plans, Army & Navy officers envisaged with uncanny accuracy the type of attack which finally came to Hawaii. But from remarks made later on, it was plain that the military minds were only playing war games then. In their hearts they did not believe in their visions.
Washington failed to get all the information it had to its field commanders. Efforts of subordinate officers to have such information sent out were unavailing. Two men were singled out by the Army Board for their fruitless but "aggressive" attempts to improve handling of intelligence. They were Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadtler (both still colonels).
It was when they turned their eyes on Washington that the Board rushed in where angels might fear to tread and coolly named Gerow, Marshall and Hull as negligent.
Marshall—because (they said) he failed to keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation "of which information he had an abundance and Short had little."
Gerow was pinned because he confused rather than informed Short with his messages. And both Marshall and Gerow were criticized because they did not take steps in the last few days to inform Short that his anti-sabotage alert was inadequate to meet the storm that might break. (War Secretary Stimson characterized the criticism of Marshall as "entirely unjustified.")