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Such a change would in part be merely a recognition of reality. Moscow's model of Marxism-Leninism has proved to be a failure. In North Korea, North Viet Nam and most of Eastern Europe, societies in which Soviet-inspired socialism has been imposed have fared miserably compared with their capitalist neighbors. Says Hyland: "The Soviet state can no longer offer ideological inspiration to the world." Some Soviets now claim to realize this. As one of * their diplomats based in Washington puts it, "There is less of a temptation to enforce our own model on others, because we are questioning our own model."
Sounds great. But all this can be proved out only in action. Gorbachev's proposed thaw will differ from the Khrushchev variety only if Moscow's apparent flexibility on arms control proves real, and if it reduces its militarist meddling in the Third World.
A group that might be called the hopeful skeptics believes that even limited changes in the Soviet attitude could be useful -- especially if the West is skillful in exploiting them. Even if the Soviets are merely seeking a breathing space, it may be quite long, given what they seek to accomplish. This could lead in unexpected directions. "It doesn't matter that much what present intentions are," Schlesinger says. "When one introduces change and the forces that go with it, one may not be able to return to original intentions."
That could depend on how the West deals with the Soviet desire for a respite. "I can't deny that this may be seen by them as a breathing space," says former President Jimmy Carter. "But sometimes there is a temporary accommodation that turns out to be long lasting, if handled right." Advises Hyland: "It is the task of Western strategy to make Gorbachev pay a price for this interlude -- a price in concessions that will advance strategic stability and the settlement of regional conflicts."
So far, the U.S. has been paralyzed in reacting to Moscow's new line partly because, as on so many foreign-policy issues, the Reagan Administration is divided. On one side are the hard-line skeptics, particularly in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff, who dismiss Soviet pronouncements as meaningless. On the other are those who believe that the U.S. should come up with ways to test Gorbachev to see if he means what he says.
The foremost advocate of this "show-me" school is George Shultz. The Secretary of State first met Gorbachev in March 1985 and was impressed with the marked difference in his outlook. "Here's the first postrevolutionary, postwar, post-Stalin leader," Shultz told colleagues, adding that he was "fascinated by what that could mean for the relationship." Most leading members of Congress tend to agree. Says Tennessee Senator Albert Gore: "It's impossible to learn how sincere they are without careful testing."
Of what, exactly? Just what concessions should the West seek as a way to determine how much reality underlies Gorbachev's rhetoric? Among the areas to explore: