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Gorbachev has shown that he understands the challenges this phenomenon presents. Unlike his recent predecessors, he has assiduously courted commercial and political relations with Asian countries. In a speech last summer in the Pacific port of Vladivostok, he declared that the "Soviet Union will try to invigorate its bilateral relations with all countries in the region, without exception."
Gorbachev will also be seeking better relations with non-Communist countries in a trip to Latin America that may occur later this year. That would make him the first Soviet leader ever to visit mainland Latin America. As in Asia, he is thus presenting the U.S. with a new type of challenge: a competition for friends and influence that is conducted by diplomatic courtship rather than through wars of national liberation and covert military activities. The old style of Soviet diplomacy, which tended to be clumsy and naysaying, was often actually helpful to America. A more sophisticated and flexible style will mean tougher competition for the U.S. Under what has been dubbed the Reagan Doctrine, the U.S. has attempted to counter traditional Soviet military expansion. But can it now come up with bold diplomatic initiatives that match Gorbachev at his new game?
This question is most critical when it comes to Western Europe. A European missile deal could be seen as "decoupling" the defense of the U.S. from that of its allies. Gorbachev's new accommodating line could also lull the West into a false sense of security and endanger the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. By employing the very opposite of cold war tactics, the Soviets could conceivably make more headway than ever in pursuit of their long- standing goal: gaining influence throughout Europe.
Given what is now known, the West cannot afford to let down its guard. The Soviet armies and the Kremlin's worldwide apparatus of subversion are not about to melt away. But if Gorbachev can show that he is serious about changing the ground upon which the superpower competition will henceforth be waged, the West should be pleased: the new playing field is one on which the Soviets are still amateurs. For if the rivalry evolves from one based on military assertion into one dominated by the force of ideas, the appeal of values and the potency of economic systems, then the U.S. and its allies have much to gain and little to fear.