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A. Theater nuclear forces were put in Europe in the first place because Europeans didn't find it credible that the U.S. would come to their defense < with nuclear strikes if only Europe were in danger of being overrun in a conventional war. Putting the nuclear capability to sea would not only be returning toward the discredited massive-retaliation doctrine, it would also mean that most if not all of the capability would be in the hands of the U.S. and Britain, which would probably cause the continental nations to again wonder if their allies would use these weapons if it became necessary. Also, the Soviets have a superior air-defense capability, and the alliance has relatively few airfields. It is therefore possible that in the Soviet military's mind, the Warsaw Pact could suppress a nuclear strike from NATO aircraft and thus lower the cost factor sufficiently so that they might conclude they could win a war in Europe that would be worth winning. That's why having nuclear missiles in Europe is essential to the overall mix.
Q. NATO only has 88 Lance short-range nuclear-capable missile launchers. The U.S. and Britain want to modernize them. Germany and most of the other NATO nations are against modernization. Since the Lances are mainly on German soil, why shouldn't their view prevail?
A. The Lance will be dead by 1995 unless is it is modernized. There is such a thing as electronic rust. That means that by '95 you could fire a Lance without enough assurance that it wouldn't be a dud. Increasing the range should be appealing to everyone, including the Germans. That means we could move the missiles back from the front lines. Increasing the Lance's range would give us more territory in which to hide them, thus making the deterrent safer, and it would give us greater flexibility about actually using them. The farther back, the more likely the missiles will survive until you need them. But we have to be careful not to push the Germans. At this point, we have the luxury of being in the research stage and of not having to push anyone on the deployment question at a time when their circuits are overloaded. My view is that we shouldn't force answers to questions before we have to ask them.
Q. But what happens to the NATO strategies of forward defense and flexible response if there is no Lance at all?
A. Forward defense is the strategy the alliance wants. It is a militarily feasible strategy, but, of course, it is not the classic defensive strategy. The classic defense is one that is mobile, trading space for time. We don't have the space to pull back, so we rely on nuclear weapons. But in a Lance- - less world, we might have to relook the strategy. The risks would increase greatly simply because we would have lessened the nuclear capability available for deterrence purposes. I for one would not like to operate at that level of risk, and I don't think the alliance would find it very satisfactory over the long run.
Q. What if the European environment changes so radically that there are no longer any nuclear weapons on the Continent at all? Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said it would be almost impossible to keep 326,000 U.S. forces in a denuclearized Europe. As the saying goes, "No nukes, no troops." Do you agree with Cheney?