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And even if an agreement on conventional parity does come off, we need to know the nature of the forces that would be left. The tank-production anomaly, for instance, indicates that we'd face a leaner but meaner Warsaw Pact force when all is said and done.
Q. Assume that a parity satisfactory to you is finally achieved. At that point, would you be willing to denuclearize Europe, as the Soviets and many Europeans want?
A. No. I don't want to see us ever do away with our nuclear capability in Europe. My No. 1 mission is to deter war, not simply win one. For 500 years, every European generation has had to learn anew about war. Now, for four decades we haven't had one here. I don't think it's a coincidence that this period has coincided with the nuclear age.
The logic for nuclear weapons in Europe has always been twofold. First, they have compensated for the conventional-force imbalance between the alliance and the Soviet bloc. Second, and more important, they are a deterrent. They raise the level of uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor. He has to consider that the cost of war may be too high. It's the element of unpredictability of what might happen in a nuclear exchange that keeps war from happening. So regardless of whether we can ever get conventional-force parity, I believe nuclear weapons have an indispensable peacekeeping value irrespective of the conventional balance.
Q. The West Germans say they believe in the value of a nuclear deterrent, but they want to negotiate with the Soviets on the short-range nuclear force (SNF) right away. What's wrong with that?
A. The problem is that the result of a negotiation might be different. We could be railroaded into something we don't want to do, which is to wipe out all nuclear weapons in Europe, the so-called third zero.
While it's true that the Soviets have more short-range nuclear weapons -- and that they've modernized their short-range missiles while we are still relying on our old Lance, we nevertheless have a sufficient capability to create that crucial uncertainty in their mind regarding a war's outcome. I don't want to risk a run to zero by opening up a negotiation in the current climate.
Q. Some who are sensitive to the internal German political situation, like Senator Sam Nunn, are urging that the West indulge the Germans' desire for immediate SNF talks, but would mandate that whatever nuclear agreement is reached not be implemented until the conventional-force agreement is carried out. Isn't that an acceptable compromise?
A. I admit it sounds fine. But, again, there is so much uncertainty about everything now that I wouldn't want to risk that kind of tied-together negotiation's running away from us to a third zero.
Q. If European opinion demands no ground-based nukes at all on European soil, NATO would still have substantial air and sea nuclear capability. Wouldn't they be sufficient?