Q. Is the West witnessing a true perestroika, or restructuring of the Soviet system, with a diminished desire for expansion, or merely a peredyshka, a breathing space, during which Moscow wants to rebuild its economic might without any real change in its long-term geopolitical objectives?
A. I agree the words are sweet, but there are a number of significant anomalies. There is a lot of dissonance between what they say, which seems to have captured everyone's imagination in the belief that the cold war is over, and what is actually being done. For example, Mikhail Gorbachev talks about withdrawing 10,000 tanks, but Soviet tank production is very high. They're now producing about 3,000 tanks a year -- far better tanks, by the way, than anything they are talking about removing. Consider what just this one indicator means. They say, and I agree after having studied it, that it will take them about two years to pull back the 10,000 tanks in an orderly fashion. By then they will have added at least 6,000 newer ones. It is certainly strange that their tank production is so high when they already have such a superiority relative to the allies. Recall too that this increase in tank production is occurring when Gorbachev says he's cutting military expenditures in order to deal with domestic needs. Taken alone, this evidence could compel you to throw up your hands, say Gorbachev isn't serious and walk away. But it is possible that Gorbachev has simply changed so many variables already, like retiring the old marshals and permitting civilian think tanks to comment on military strategy, that production is an area he simply hasn't got around to yet.
On the other hand, maybe he wants to delay dealing with armaments production till he feels more confident about his control over the military. The Soviet sale of bombers to Libya is another action that makes no sense when compared to Gorbachev's rhetoric. The fact that one has to weigh and wonder about all this means that we have to keep our powder dry and not rush into big reductions when the jury is still out.
Meanwhile, the problem of Western euphoria over Gorbachev is complicated by Moscow's having been particularly clever in its understanding of the public relations value of unilateral announcements -- something the West has yet to learn. When the Soviets make unilateral announcements, Moscow reaps a tremendous p.r. benefit, and I'm left with the reality -- continued huge Soviet military capabilities. It's difficult to get the public to realize that unilateral pronouncements uncodified by treaty are easy to turn around, as are intentions generally. I'm routinely criticized for a supposedly overly simplistic insistence on assessing capabilities rather than intentions. Well, we hope Gorbachev means what he says, but if he changes his mind and we have reduced our own military strength on the basis of a rhetoric of intentions when his capabilities haven't really changed much at all, then we could be in big trouble fast.
Q. But Gorbachev has now offered to reduce the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces essentially to parity with NATO's. Isn't that what we've always wanted?
A. It depends on the fine print and on what becomes of our nuclear capability in the process. A parity of conventional forces has never meant peace in Europe.