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The existence of the phantoms challenges many of the ideas that underlie the present nonproliferation system, especially the nonproliferation treaty. The 123 nations that have joined the U.S., the Soviet Union and Britain as signatories have renounced the right to build atomic weapons.* They have also given up a bit of their national sovereignty by agreeing to
allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to nuclear technology on their soil and to demand similar inspection agreements from customers for their nuclear exports. The nonweapons signatories are in turn guaranteed access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology.
By refusing to sign or ratify the treaty, the new nuclear powers have implicitly declared their distrust of the nuclear balance of power. Says K. Subrahmanyam, head of India's Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses: "I refuse to be an Uncle Tom who would accept the right of white nations to wield nuclear weapons and have the developing world disarmed and subject to nuclear terrorism." More aggressive variations on that theme can be found in a country like Libya, which has accepted the nonproliferation treaty, but whose erratic anti-Western policies make it a highly suspect adherent.
The phantoms add a nuclear dimension to existing regional conflicts, in the sense that the intrusion of the atom could heighten the possibility of conventional confrontation. A stark example is Israel's 1981 air attack against the French-built Tammuz nuclear reactor in Iraq. The Israeli explanation for the assault was that the regime of President Saddam Hussein secretly intended to build nuclear weapons, even though Iraq had signed the nonproliferation treaty. While ambiguous circumstances surrounded the Iraqi project, including the inordinate size and sophistication of the reactor, which the Iraqis insisted be fueled with weapons-grade uranium, the Israelis have yet to prove their contention. What the Tammuz incident demonstrates is that proliferation is a mix of technical capability and political intent. As the technology spreads, gauging what a country plans to do with its nuclear capability becomes very difficult, if not impossible.
Proliferation is a sensitive issue for the Reagan Administration, which came to office in 1981 severely critical of Jimmy Carter's policies in that area. Under Carter, the U.S. made nonproliferation a highly visible priority and attacked the problem from the supply side, banning U.S. exports that involved uranium enrichment or reprocessing. The centerpiece of the Carter approach was the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (as distinct from the nonproliferation treaty). That legislation, still in effect, demands that a customer for U.S. nuclear sales promise to place not only the exported item but all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, a condition known in the jargon of the nuclear community as "full-scope" safeguards. Among countries exporting nuclear wares, only Canada, Australia and Sweden have adopted a similar stand. Most other suppliers, particularly in Western Europe, insist on the adoption of safeguards only for the particular item being sold.