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Greater and more farsighted cooperation among nuclear suppliers is another necessity. The U.S. and other sellers need to update the export trigger list continuously, even if, as the Pakistan case shows, its mere existence is no defense against espionage or theft. Only more stringent, worldwide security measures will work in combating proliferation by criminal means. Supplier nations need to impose stiffer penalties on individuals and firms that either violate atomic export restrictions or fail to investigate the bona fides of would-be purchasers.
The U.S. has to continue to press its allies to bring export standards into line with the full-scope safeguard concept. That may take time and tact. Says former I.A.E.A. Official Fischer: "There is still suspicion in Western Europe of U.S. motives in pressing for full-scope safeguards." Pressure from Washington is sometimes seen by Europeans as a ploy to improve the U.S. competitive position. Nonetheless, Fischer notes, there has been a "very distinct change" in French export practices over the past decade. U.S. pressure has played a role in that.
One heartening sign is the close cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on proliferation issues. Last November, U.S. and Soviet representatives agreed in Moscow that henceforth they would hold two working sessions a year to discuss the problem. Said a Soviet specialist in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in November: "We do not have much time to come to an agreement before nuclear weapons spread to more and more countries that could involve us in a conflict." One example that nuclear powers who abjure the nonproliferation treaty should be encouraged to follow is that of France. Despite their refusal to sign the treaty, the French as long ago as 1968 declared that they would abide by the accord in demanding international safeguards from any country that sought to buy their technology. Both Brazil and Argentina have followed the same practice in recent deals with China; such behavior should be applauded when appropriate and, if possible, rewarded.
At some point the U.S. will have to come to grips with a double standard in its own nonproliferation policy, specifically as it is directed at Israel. While Israel's special relationship with the U.S. makes it an exceptional case, Washington's attitude toward Jerusalem, as Van Doren puts it, "could prove to be the Achilles' heel of our nonproliferation policy." Other would- be nuclear powers cannot fail to note the high levels of U.S. economic and military assistance bestowed on Israel despite its bomb-in-the-basement status and draw their own conclusions about the universal sincerity of U.S. antiproliferation efforts.
If the challenge of proliferation is grim, the situation could be much worse. Playing for time in the effort to curb further growth of the nuclear nemesis has never been time wasted. But the harsh fact cannot be brushed aside: ( proliferation is not an arcane and unpleasant prospect to be avoided but a reality that must be confronted. The world's spreading nuclear capability is far more dangerous than it used to be. Full recognition of that state of affairs is necessary if mankind is ever to quiet its nuclear fears.