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-- In Los Angeles, a federal grand jury has indicted a U.S. citizen for exporting to Israel 810 high-speed precision switches known as Krytrons, in contravention of U.S. export laws. It is an open secret that Israel has its own atomic weapons program; Krytrons can be used as part of the trigger mechanism for nuclear arms. But Israel offered to return many of the switches, and the U.S. State Department accepted Jerusalem's explanation that it did not intend to use the devices in its atomic weapons program. Still, the incident demonstrates the ease with which highly sensitive technology necessary for nuclear-arms manufacture can, and does, escape control.
-- In Washington next month, two House Foreign Affairs subcommittees will hold joint hearings on the global spread of plutonium, the highly toxic atomic explosive. An estimated 55 tons of separated plutonium exists in the West, a stockpile that is growing by five to six tons a year. Among the issues likely to be discussed by legislators at the hearings is the potential that plutonium traffic offers to nuclear terrorism.
-- In Geneva in September, delegates from about 85 countries will meet to review progress under the 1968 United Nations-sponsored Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty is the most important accomplishment of the worldwide antiproliferation effort, but it expires in 1995 and there is no guarantee that it will be renewed. The atmosphere at the review session could be tense. Third World countries are expected to criticize the superpowers for failing to work toward nuclear disarmament, a promise embedded in the treaty. To some of the more militant Third World countries, that failure smacks of hypocrisy. The biggest fear is that one of the restive nations might withdraw from the treaty at the September session; if that happened, it would mean a calamitous setback, the first explicit unraveling of the world's major nonproliferation accord.
-- In Washington and elsewhere, nonproliferation experts are concerned over an erosion of confidence in the inspection apparatus of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the system is designed to monitor adherence to nonproliferation standards. The concern focuses on the "safeguards" sponsored by the I.A.E.A. to detect the diversion of peaceful atomic technology to bomb-making purposes. Some experts fear that the safeguard scheme is inadequate to the task at hand, while others are worried that the lack of confidence can itself lead to further weakening of an inspection system that in large measure functions on a basis of trust.
Proliferation invokes atavistic fears and uncertainties because it involves arcane and highly sophisticated technologies: breeder reactors, plutonium reprocessing plants, uranium-enrichment facilities.* Says Leonard Weiss, an expert on the U.S. Senate staff: "Proliferation is a set of symptoms with a number of causes. It is both a political and technical problem. Therefore no single cure, or set of cures, will work."
What experts agree on is the problem's perniciousness. "I used to think that