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Syrian President Assad's motives appear far more complex. He probably hoped to frighten the Lebanese into rejecting the Shultz agreement because, in his view, the agreement would leave Israel in a position to threaten Syria militarily. Assad still thinks of Lebanon, which used to be part of Syria, as something of a dependency, and he objects to any diplomatic developments that might threaten its traditional pro-Arab position. Specifically, Assad dislikes the provisions in the Shultz agreement that call for stalks leading to an improvement in relations between Israel and Lebanon once the foreign troops have all gone home. The reason: Since Camp David, Assad has been determined to keep any other Arab country from signing a separate peace treaty with Israel. He opposes any step-by-step approach to solving the region's problems, favoring instead a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East. Without such a settlement, he fears that Syria will lose all hope of retrieving the Golan Heights, which Israel seized from Syria in the 1967 war and annexed in 1981.
According to U.S. diplomats, Assad's current war of nerves is primarily a bargaining ploy. He has not rejected the Israeli-Lebanese withdrawal agreement totally; instead, he appears to be laying down his opening bid in a long, difficult and undoubtedly costly process of negotiation. After his own disappointing stopover in Damascus, Secretary of State Shultz insisted that, despite Syria's lack of enthusiasm, it had not "slammed the door" on an eventual agreement. Shultz was equally optimistic when he reported on his mission to President Reagan. Said the Secretary: "I am confident that in the end [the withdrawal] will happen."
Maybe so, but the diplomatic price will be considerable. Assad opposed President Reagan's peace plan of last September because he saw nothing in it for Syria. In Assad's eyes, the Reagan plan, which called for the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to be linked with Jordan, threatened to split Jordan and the P.L.O. from Syria, much as Egypt had been split from the rest of the Arab world when it made peace with Israel in 1979.
Accordingly, Assad played an instrumental role in blocking Jordanian King Hussein's entry into any U.S.-sponsored negotiations. He told P.L.O. Chairman Arafat that if the P.L.O. tacitly allowed Hussein to join the peace process, Syria would establish a rival P.L.O. in Damascus that would speak for Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria. To preserve his organization, Arafat withdrew from his talks with Hussein. In an effort to placate Arafat, Assad agreed to let the P.L.O. increase its troop strength in Lebanon.
In the meantime, the Soviets moved with inordinate speed to rearm Syria after last year's debacle. The original Soviet motive was simply to re-establish its military relationship with Syria and the radical Arabs. Later, as the withdrawal negotiations foundered, the Soviets spotted an unexpected target of opportunity: a chance to play a pivotal role in an arena from which they have largely been excluded for six years. In effect acknowledging their increasing influence, Shultz last week asked the Soviets to "get on the side of peace" and to urge Syria to pull its troops out of Lebanon.