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On March 23, in the Oval Office, I counseled the President to go slow. "Hold off, there's no rush," I said. "Let me meet with Dobrynin and feel the vibes. If we can't get a concession, then we can go ahead." It is an enduring truth that you can never negotiate successfully by making concessions that your negotiating partner knows about in advance.
But my attempts to persuade Block and Meese, and ultimately Reagan, that the embargo was a very important foreign policy issue did not succeed. It was viewed almost exclusively as a domestic issue. When, finally, the embargo was lifted, it came as a sudden action. On April 21, Meese summoned me to the White House and informed me that the embargo would be lifted on Friday, April 24. This left virtually no time to consult with other governments. There was no provision for a decent interval in which our friends and allies could do all the things that are necessary to minimize the political and economic shock. I said we needed more time; to act in such rude haste would undermine the Administration's reputation as a responsible partner. Meese replied that the decision had been made.
Speaking to Dobrynin on this issue was the most distasteful thing I had to do since coming to Washington. After I notified him that the embargo would be lifted as a gesture of good will because the Soviets had restrained themselves so far in Poland, Dobrynin asked, "Are there any restrictions at all?"
"The decision could be affected by any surprise move on the part of your government," I replied. I nearly choked on the words.
Punishing Friends, Not Foes
Against the backdrop of that episode, it was supremely ironic that when the hammer of American economic power finally smashed down, it did not strike the Russians or the military government of Poland, as the hard-liners in the Administration had wanted, but instead battered our friends and allies, started the most serious squabble within NATO in recent memory and placed self-generated strains on the alliance at the very time when Western unity was essential to deal with a whole range of politically explosive issues.
In its anxiety to conduct an exemplary public punishment of the Soviet Union, Washington first demanded that its European allies stop supplying American technology for the trans-Siberian pipeline designed to carry natural gas to Western Europe, and when the allies demurred on grounds of legality, economics and sovereignty, the Administration applied sanctions to them.
In every meeting with Soviet officials, I continued to stress that all hope of progress on every question involving our countries depended on Soviet behavior toward Poland. When Foreign Minister Gromyko and I met in New York City on Sept. 23, 1981—my first encounter with him as Secretary of State—I seized the occasion to tell him that the Polish situation was a matter of great concern to the U.S. He made no reply.
Of Gromyko, the inimitable Nikita Khrushchev said, "He will sit